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INTRODUCTION
It is telling, but perhaps unsurprising that the legal and
regulatory structures that helped cause the subprime mortgage
crisis are also making it more difficult to address the resulting
flood of mortgage defaults and foreclosures. Securitization
lowered underwriting standards by allowing mortgage lenders to
sell poorly underwritten loans, leaving investors to deal with the
ensuing defaults. Securitization also is making it more difficult
to resolve these problem loans, as they were stranded in
securitized loan pools, and their resolution is often stymied by
servicers’ self-interest and unwillingness to spend the resources
to modify the loans. Similarly, the deregulatory fever which
swept Washington during the Bush Administration made it
easier for lenders to reduce their underwriting standards without
adequately informing investors.1 As foreclosures mounted and
servicers responded with robo-signing of foreclosure documents
and other abusive practices, regulators seemed almost mystified
as to who regulated mortgage servicers and how servicers should
be regulated. When Congress passed the Home Affordable
Modification Program (HAMP), there was so little expertise in
regulating servicers among the federal agencies that the job of
overseeing HAMP was passed to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac,
who have proven largely unable, and to a great extent even
unwilling to rein in servicer misconduct.2 And so deregulation
not only led to the creation of risky loans, it hampered the ability
of the federal government to create effective programs to reduce
the harm caused by those loans to borrowers, investors, and the
public.
A third cause of the mortgage meltdown that has also
interfered with cleaning up the resulting foreclosure crisis is
federal preemption of state laws. During the subprime boom
ending in 2007, federal banking agencies insisted that their
regulations preempted the state initiatives that could have
slowed predatory lending and the creation of risky home loans.
States attempted to curb predatory lending through a variety of
state laws.3
In response, the federally regulated banking
1 For a discussion of how securitization allowed lenders to reduce underwriting
standards without adequate disclosure to investors, see Kurt Eggert, The Great Collapse:
How Securitization Caused the Subprime Meltdown, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1257 (2009).
2 See
CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, 111TH CONG., DECEMBER OVERSIGHT
REPORT 82 (2010), available at http://cybercemetery.unt.edu/archive/cop/20110402010243/
http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-121410-report.pdf.
3 For a discussion of the various state statutes directed at halting such predatory
lending, see Jessica Fogel, State Consumer Protection Statutes: An Alternative Approach
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industry sought protection from state regulation by requesting
that federal regulators determine that those state laws were
preempted and so could be ignored by federally regulated banks
and thrifts. Not coincidentally, federally regulated banks and
thrifts have seen higher default rates in their mortgages than
state regulated banks and thrifts, with lenders regulated by the
federal Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) among the worst
offenders. Moreover, states were tempted to loosen their own
regulations, or face losing their state banks to a more permissive
federal charter.
Just as preemption by federal regulatory agencies helped
cause the mortgage meltdown, preemption has been a barrier to
state efforts to address the meltdown. Mortgage servicers that
are federally regulated banks or their subsidiaries have claimed
that they are free from state regulation, whether in the form of
state regulators seeking to examine their practices, or state laws
and regulations aimed at inducing servicers to modify loans
where appropriate.4 Instead, these mortgage servicers have
regularly argued that only federal regulation applies to them.
Federal regulation of servicers has been weak and sparse, with
few carrots and almost no sticks, and federal regulators have
until recently had an almost entirely hands-off attitude toward
the servicers. As a result, federally-regulated servicers have
engaged in significant misbehavior, including the infamous
“robo-signing” scandals, where servicer employees were certifying
the debt and defaults for borrowers in notarized statements
without personal knowledge of those debts or whether borrowers
were even in default.5 On too many occasions, servicers have
attempted to foreclose on homes even when it appears that
neither they nor the trust they represent possess the note that
would allow such foreclosure.6 And servicers have regularly piled
excessive or unfounded fees on borrowers, at times pushing
borrowers into foreclosure with such fees alone.
At the same time, servicers have failed to modify loans
where appropriate, and have foreclosed even when a loan
modification might have been best for both the borrower and the
investors that hold the loans.
By attempting to shield

to Solving the Problem of Predatory Mortgage Lending, 28 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 435, 451–53
(2005).
4 See infra, Section VI.
5 See Lorraine Woellert, ‘Robo-signing’ Penalties Expected Soon, BOSTON GLOBE,
Feb. 24, 2011, at 11.
6 See Gretchen Morgenson, Guess What Got Lost in the Pool, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1,
2009, at BU1.
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themselves with preemption from state regulation, and through
the dearth of effective federal regulation, mortgage servicers
have been acting as a law unto themselves, to the detriment of
both the borrowers they collect from and the investors whom they
are supposed to serve.
While there is only limited information regarding the
servicing practices of non-federally regulated servicers, it
appears that state community banks have avoided at least the
worst practices of federally-regulated servicers so far. When the
FDIC examined these state-regulated servicers, it did not find
evidence of robo-signing or any other serious problems that have
appeared industry-wide or that would warrant the FDIC taking
formal enforcement action against these much smaller servicers.7
Furthermore, a recent Treasury Department analysis of
mortgage servicers revealed that the three worst offenders were
all national banks.
The new Dodd-Frank Act was drafted with recognition of the
abuses of preemption in the mortgage industry. The Consumer
Financial Protection Act of 2010, which is Title X of Dodd-Frank,
calls for a rollback of preemption and for greater state action to
prevent future servicing abuses by federally regulated banks and
thrifts.8 The exact contours of this new law of preemption in the
banking industry are not clear because Dodd-Frank leaves much
of its specific effects to regulations not yet drafted by the
respective federal agencies. Moreover, the OTS will disappear
and be subsumed into the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (OCC). A new regulator will appear—the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB)—beginning in July, 2011,
with the inevitable lag time in any regulations it might enact.9
With the creation of the CFPB, new turf battles may arise, with
the OCC and the CFPB battling to provide mortgage servicer
regulations that may defend consumers against banks, or viceversa.

7 See Carrie Bay, FDIC Releases Report Detailing Findings of Foreclosure
Investigation, DSNEWS (May 4, 2011), http://www.dsnews.com/articles/fdic-releasesreport-detailing-findings-of-foreclosure-investigation-2011-05-04 (explaining that in a
2011 FDIC report, the FDIC has to date failed to uncover any evidence of ‘robo-signing’ or
other problems with state non-member banks which would call for disciplinary action to
be taken).
8 See generally Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub.
L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
9 Lewis S. Wiener & Evan J. Taylor, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau,
SUTHERLAND (Mar. 8, 2011), http://www.sutherland.com/files/News/cce089c9-6087-4cf69b87-0094eef8b957/Presentation/NewsAttachment/d7939b30-458d-4ccf-bda2e3db48c38a97/ACC Financial Services - CFPB Legal Alert - March 2011.pdf.
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Federal agencies have, after what appears to be a pro forma
investigation of mortgage abuses, issued a report admitting the
existence of those abuses and outlined a plan to correct them.
However, the plan appears at first blush to be a weak one, with
mortgage servicers ordered to correct their own policies and
procedures and internal controls, and to hire their own monitor,
with the approval of federal regulators, and then report back
with what they have done.10 The federal regulators appear to be
punting the regulation of mortgage servicers to outside firms
chosen and hired by the servicers themselves.
This article is an attempt to show what went wrong in the
previous regulation of mortgage servicing (or lack thereof), and to
map the new preemption terrain for mortgage servicing,
providing some guideposts on what the new post-Dodd-Frank
preemption landscape will look like and where the boundaries for
state action might lie. States should not wait for the federal
agencies to act. Instead, states should move now to regulate
mortgage servicers to deter the abuses servicers have been
committing and to encourage appropriate loan modifications that
benefit both borrower and investor alike. With the new rules of
preemption, states should step boldly into what, even with recent
federal action, mostly still is a void: the regulation of mortgage
servicing.
I. THE FAILURES OF MORTGAGE SERVICING
Though the abuses and failures of mortgage servicers have
long been detailed,11 it was as if they were discovered anew, first
by Congress and the news media, and then belatedly by federal
regulators in the fall of 2010. The many failures of mortgage
servicers suddenly became a hot topic, both in Congress and in
the news.12 Journalists reported nationwide evidence of “robo-

10 See Regulatory Actions Related to Foreclosure Activities by Large Servicers and
Practical Implications for Community Banks, FDIC, http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/
examinations/supervisory/insights/sise11/foreclosure.html (last visited May 19, 2011).
11 See generally Kurt Eggert, Limiting Abuse and Opportunism by Mortgage
Servicers, 15 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 753, 753–84 (2004), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=992095 (discussing abusive behavior of residential mortgage
servicers towards borrowers).
12 Congress has defined a “servicer” as “the person responsible for servicing of a loan
(including the person who makes or holds a loan if such person also services the loan).” 12
U.S.C.A. § 2605(i)(2) (2011). On the other hand, “servicing” is “receiving any scheduled
periodic payments from a borrower pursuant to the terms of any loan . . . and making the
payments of principal and interest and such other payments with respect to the amounts
received from the borrower as may be required pursuant to the terms of the loan.” 12
U.S.C.A. § 2605(i)(3) (2011).
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signing,” by mortgage servicers seeking to foreclose on homes.13
One court has defined a “robo-signer” as “a person who quickly
signs hundreds or thousands of foreclosure documents in a
month, despite swearing that he or she has personally reviewed
the mortgage documents and has not done so.”14 One bank
admitted to false attestations on 55,000 affidavits.15 A bank
employee who said that she signed up to 8000 affidavits and
other foreclosure-related documents a month admitted that she
normally did not read any of them.16 Another servicer employee,
this one a supervisor in charge of signing affidavits, stated that
she did not know what conditions justified foreclosure, that she
could not even define the meaning of necessary terms like
“promissory note,” and stated, “I don’t know the ins and outs of
the loan, I just sign documents.”17 The practice of robo-signing
appeared so wide-spread that many of the nation’s largest
mortgage servicers declared moratoriums on foreclosures, either
nationally or at least in states that require judicial foreclosure
while they investigated their own practices.18
Robo-signing constitutes fraud on the court if the resulting
affidavits are submitted as evidence. By using robo-signers,
banks and servicers can foreclose on borrowers while hiding from
courts the flaws or gaps in their loan records regarding mortgage
payments or loan modifications, or concealing whether they are
missing the loan documents demonstrating whether they even
have the right to foreclose. Sadly, servicers have found that some
attorneys have been all too willing to play “hide the ball” with
courts to obtain foreclosure orders without valid evidence. In one
case, a court noted that the legal representation of servicers in
foreclosure actions had devolved into a “corrosive ‘assembly line’
culture of practicing law” and wondered “what kind of culture

13 See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, Banks’ Flawed Paperwork Throws Some
Foreclosures Into Chaos, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2010, at A1; David Streitfeld, 3rd Lender Will
Freeze Foreclosures in the Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2010, at B1.
14 Onewest Bank, F.S.B. v. Drayton, 910 N.Y.S. 2d 857, 859 (Sup. Ct. 2010). In
Drayton the court dismissed a foreclosure action without prejudice upon request of
plaintiff, with the court noting that the case involved a servicer employee who, in a
deposition in another action, had “admitted that she: is a ‘robo-signer’ who executes about
750 mortgage documents a week, without a notary public present; does not spend more
than 30 seconds signing each document; [and] does not read the documents before signing
them . . . .” Id.
15 Jeff Horwitz, Wells Joins Robo Club, in its Way, AM. BANKER, Oct. 29, 2010, at 1.
16 Jenifer B. McKim, Lenders on Autopilot: Using Robo-Signers to Process Thousands
of Foreclosures Opens Banks Up to Legal Risks, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 2, 2010, at 7.
17 Michelle Conlin, Robo-Signers: Mortgage Experience Not Necessary, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Oct. 12, 2010.
18 Nelson D. Schwartz, Foreclosures Had Errors, Bank Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25,
2010, at B1.
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condones its lawyers lying to the court and then retreating to the
office hoping that the Court will forget about the whole
matter?”19 The Florida Attorney General’s office has been
investigating claims that foreclosure attorneys in that state have
been “fabricating and/or presenting false and misleading
documents in foreclosure cases,” and reached a $2 million
settlement with one prominent firm based on such claims.20
Even foreclosure attorneys who otherwise might attempt to
follow the rules of court are at times being pushed by their
servicer clients to engage in mindless, automated court filings,
unable to verify if the information contained in their filings is
even true because the attorneys are being directed solely by
computer software that spits out what documents and claims to
file. One court found that a bank servicing its own loans used
mortgage servicing software that
manages, without human interaction, the relationship between [the
bank] and its attorneys in the collection of delinquent mortgage loans
through automated responses to certain queues” and that the software
program “is the mortgage banking industry’s most widely used
servicing system with more than 50% of all mortgages in the United
States serviced on it.21

The court seemed astounded to learn that the “entire process
occurs without any communication between counsel and the
client and for the most part, without any legal judgment by an
attorney.”22
Some argue that a larger problem for mortgage servicers is
that often neither they nor the trusts for which they work
actually hold some of the notes on which they are attempting to
foreclose.23 There is significant anecdotal evidence that, on a
wide scale basis, notes were not validly transferred to the trusts
for which servicers work.24
In re Parsley, 384 B.R. 138, 183–84 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2008).
David McLaughlin, Florida Settles with Law Firm in Foreclosure Investigation,
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 25, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-03-25/florida-lawfirm-to-pay-2-million-over-state-foreclosure-investigation.html.
21 In re Taylor, 407 B.R. 618, 624 & n.9 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2009).
22 Id. at 637.
23 Brady Dennis & Ariana Eunjung Cha, In Foreclosure Controversy, Problems Run
Deeper
than
Flawed
Paperwork,
WASH.
POST
(Oct.
7,
2010),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/10/06/
AR2010100607227.html?sid=ST2010100607251.
24 See Morgenson, supra note 6, at BU1.
See also Dale A. Whitman, How
Negotiability Has Fouled Up the Secondary Mortgage Market, And What to Do About It,
37 PEPP. L. REV. 737, 758 (2010) (“While delivery of the note might seem a simple matter
of compliance, experience during the past several years has shown that, probably in
countless thousands of cases, promissory notes were never delivered to secondary market
investors or securitizers, and, in many cases, cannot presently be located at all. The issue
19
20
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Consumer advocates complain that robo-signing is just the
tip of the iceberg, and that servicers mistreat borrowers much
more broadly by charging excessive or inappropriate fees, forcing
borrowers to purchase high-cost insurance even though they
already have insurance in place, and foreclosing without good
cause or when both borrowers and the investors who own the
loan would benefit from the borrower obtaining a loan
modification.25 Mortgage servicers can profit greatly from late
fees and other charges when borrowers are in default, and
industry insiders and other critics have long charged that
mortgage servicers withhold some loan modifications that might
help investors and borrowers alike so that the servicers can
collect greater fees.26 Another reason servicers have been slow to
modify loans is that loan modification is a labor-intensive
process, requiring the servicer in essence to re-underwrite the
loan to determine how much the borrower can afford.27 By hiring
too little staff to engage in the many appropriate loan
modifications requested, servicers can save large sums, as much
as $20 billion by one leaked confidential estimate.28 The
existence and nature of loan modifications is a crucial
determinant in whether borrowers who go into default are able to
save their homes from foreclosure.29 However, the pace of loan

is extremely widespread, and, in many cases, appears to have been the result of a
conscious policy on the part of mortgage sellers to retain, rather than transfer, the notes
representing the loans they were selling.”).
25 See Problems in Mortgage Servicing from Modification to Foreclosure: Hearing
Before the U.S. S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 1–5 (2010)
(testimony of Diane E. Thompson, National Consumer Law Center), available at
http://banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&
FileStore_id=c1fac0f6-5ac5-4ae5-85cc-e2220255dfd9. See also Robo-Signing, Chain of
Title, Loss Mitigation, and Other Issues in Mortgage Servicing: Hearings Before the H.
Fin. Servs. Comm., Subcomm. on Hous. and Cmty. Opportunity, 111th Cong. 15 (2010)
(testimony of Prof. Adam J. Levitin, Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University
Law Center), available at http://financialservices.house.gov/Media/file/hearings/111/
Levitin111810.pdf; HAMP, Servicer Abuses, and Foreclosure Prevention Strategies:
Hearings Before the Cong. Oversight Panel, 111th Cong. 1–3 (2010) (testimony of Julia
Gordon, Center for Responsible Lending), available at http://cop.senate.gov/documents/
testimony-102710-gordon.pdfhttp://cop.senate.gov/documents/testimony-102710gordon.pdf.
26 Peter S. Goodman, Late-Fee Profits May Trump Plan to Modify Loans, N.Y. TIMES,
July 30, 2009, at A1.
27 See Kurt Eggert, Comment on Michael A. Stegman et al.’s “Preventive Servicing Is
Good for Business and Affordable Homeownership Policy”: What Prevents Loan
Modifications?, 18 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 279, 285 (2007).
28 See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, PERSPECTIVES ON SETTLEMENT ALTERNATIVE
IN MORTGAGE SERVICING (2011), available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/03/28/
big-banks-save-billions-homeowners-suffer_n_841712.html.
29 See Sumit Agarwal et al., Market-Based Loss Mitigation Practices for Troubled
Mortgages Following the Financial Crisis 5 (Fisher Coll. of Bus., Working Paper No. 201003-019, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1690627 (“In particular, greater
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modifications has been glacial, with a recent report that “80% of
all non-performing private-label mortgages have not been
modified after twelve months.”30 Securitized loans in default are
significantly less likely to be modified than loans held in portfolio
by a financial institution, showing that servicers are not
modifying loans as they would if they owned the loans
themselves.31 The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) recently
obtained a settlement for $108 million from two servicer units of
Countrywide, now owned by Bank of America.
The FTC
chairman noted that Countrywide had marked up some fees
more than 400% and stated that “[t]he record-keeping of
Countrywide was abysmal. . . . Most frat houses have better
record-keeping than Countrywide.”32
Worse yet, this pattern of abusive behavior, along with an
inadequate federal response, is not new, as even early in the last
decade, servicers had perfected the art of using unfair practices
to squeeze fees out of borrowers.33 For years, courts have found
that servicers attempted to foreclose even when it appears that
no foreclosure was justified. In the 2002 case, In re Gorshtein,
the court sanctioned servicers who falsely claimed borrowers
were in default, saying that its decision was “provoked by an
apparently increasing number of motions in this Court to vacate
the automatic stay filed by secured creditors often based upon
attorney affidavits certifying material post-petition defaults
where, in fact, there were no material defaults by the debtors.”34
Sadly, such cases continue unabated. In August 2010, a
court noted how a servicer, through a combination of
reductions in loan interest rates (or monthly payments) are associated with sizable
declines in redefault rates. As an illustration, a reduction of 1% point in the interest rate
is associated with a 3.9% point drop in six-month redefault rate.”).
30 See Brian Collins, It’s Hard Out There for a Mortgage Servicer..., MORTGAGE
SERVICING NEWS, Jan. 2011, at 6 (citing data from the Amherst Securities Group).
31 Sumit Agarwal, et al., The Role of Securitization in Mortgage Renegotiation 1–4
(Charles A. Dice Ctr., Working Paper No. 2011-2, 2011), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1739915. The authors argue “that the rate of loan modification,
which constitutes the lion’s share (over 75%) of private renegotiation actions, is also
significantly higher for portfolio loans. Specifically, portfolio-held loans are 4.2 to 5.8
percentage points (34% to 51% in relative terms) more likely to be modified.” Id. at 4.
32 Corbett B. Daly, B of A’s Countrywide Settles with FTC for $108 Million, REUTERS
(June
7,
2010),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/06/07/us-countrywide-ftcidUSTRE6563DT20100607.
33 Fairbanks Capital was likely the most notorious mortgage servicer in the years
following the turn of the century, and settled an action with the Federal Trade
Commission for $40 million. For a discussion of the Fairbanks matter and further
evidence of servicing abuse in the era before the mortgage meltdown, see Kurt Eggert,
Limiting Abuse and Opportunism by Mortgage Servicers, 15 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 753,
761–67 (2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=992095.
34 In re Gorshtein, 285 B.R. 118, 120 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002).
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inappropriate fees and the servicer’s own incompetence,
attempted to foreclose on two borrowers who had paid their loan
like “clockwork.”35 The court stated that the servicer’s conduct
represents the most callous and egregious effort to collect an
indebtedness that was never owed that this court has been called
upon to review. Succinctly stated, [the servicer’s] incompetent
servicing tactics converted a loan transaction that was being paid like
‘clockwork’ to a loan that was virtually impossible to pay, particularly
for modest income borrowers.36

A study of servicer claims in bankruptcy court found that
“[a] majority of mortgage companies’ proofs of claim lack the
documentation necessary to establish a valid debt. Fees and
charges on bankruptcy claims often are identified poorly and
sometimes do not appear to be legally permissible.”37 These are
filings in bankruptcy court, where a servicer is perhaps most
likely to dot i’s and cross t’s, given the bankruptcy court’s
oversight. A recent survey of consumer attorneys indicates that
a large percentage of the borrowers they represent have had
foreclosure proceedings initiated either due to “improper fees or
payment processing” or while the borrower is “awaiting a loan
modification.”38 The U.S. Trustee’s office has been investigating
bankruptcy filings by mortgage servicers and has reportedly
discovered error rates among those filings that “might be ten
times higher” than the one percent error rate claimed by
mortgage servicers in Senate testimony.39 One servicer/bank
claimed the borrower owed over $50,000, but when the trustee
“asked for documentation, the amount dropped to $3,156.”40
According to the U.S. Trustee director, the flaws in the servicers’
processes “undermine the integrity of the bankruptcy system.
Many homeowners have been harmed,” by such bad practices as
submitting inaccurate statements or attempting to foreclose even

In re Cothern, 442 B.R. 494, 496–97, 499 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 2010).
Id. at 499. In Cothern, the servicer first wrongly concluded that the borrowers’
house was uninsured and so bought force-placed insurance. Id. at 496–97. Even when it
realized its mistake, the servicer placed the borrowers’ payments into a suspense account
rather than fixing the problem and in the end tried to collect fees totaling roughly
$15,000, made up of attorney’s fees, foreclosure fees, and other charges. The court stated
that “[t]here is no doubt that the unrelenting actions of [the servicer] drove the Cotherns
into bankruptcy.” Id. at 499.
37 Katherine M. Porter, Misbehavior and Mistake in Bankruptcy Mortgage Claims,
87 TEX. L. REV. 121, 124 (2008).
38 Servicers Continue to Wrongfully Initiate Foreclosures, NAT’L ASS’N OF CONSUMER
ADVOCS. & THE NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR. (Dec. 15, 2010), http://www.naca.net/_assets/
shared/634280136429845000.pdf.
39 See Gretchen Morgenson, A Low Bid for Fixing a Big Mess, N.Y. TIMES, May 14,
2011, at BU1, available at www.nytimes.com/2011/05/15/business/15gret.html.
40 Id.
35
36
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when borrowers are making proper payments on trial loan
modifications.41
Faced with widespread evidence of servicer malfeasance,
fifty state Attorneys General banded together to investigate the
robo-signing problem and then expanded this investigation to
include problems in the servicing industry more generally.42
Federal banking regulators, long too silent and passive regarding
mortgage servicing, responded by asking servicers “to conduct
self-assessments of their foreclosure management processes and
correct any deficiencies,” but also began their own investigation
of mortgage servicers.43 They have reported significant problems
in the servicing industry, noting “critical deficiencies and
shortcomings in foreclosure governance processes, foreclosure
document preparation processes, and oversight and monitoring of
third party law firms and vendors” which resulted in “violations
of state and local foreclosure laws . . . and have had an adverse
affect [sic] on the functioning of the mortgage markets and the
U.S. economy as a whole.”44
The federal interagency review of the fourteen top servicers
included eight national banks regulated by the OCC, four thrifts
regulated by the OTS, and two other financial institutions
regulated by the Federal Reserve’s Board of Governors.45 The
reviewers found “widespread unsafe or unsound operational
practices, including missing documents, execution of documents
by unauthorized persons, failure to notarize documents in
accordance with local law, inaccurate affidavits, and affidavits
signed by persons lacking sufficient knowledge of the underlying
mortgage loan transactions.”46 The review demonstrated that
federal regulators had woefully failed to deter misconduct by
mortgage servicers.

Id.
See, e.g., Miller Says Foreclosure Investigation is Broad-Based, DES MOINES
SUNDAY REG., Dec. 12, 2010, at 1D.
43 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-433, MORTGAGE FORECLOSURES:
DOCUMENTATION PROBLEMS REVEAL NEED FOR ONGOING REGULATORY OVERSIGHT 25
(2011) [hereinafter GAO DOCUMENTATION PROBLEMS REPORT], available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11433.pdf.
44 Testimony of John Walsh Acting Comptroller of the Currency: Hearings Before the
U.S. S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 15 (2011), (testimony
of John Walsh, Acting Comptroller of the Currency), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/
news-issuances/congressional-testimony/2011/pub-test-2011-19-written.pdf.
45 See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., REGULATORY ACTIONS RELATED TO FORECLOSURE
ACTIVITIES BY LARGE SERVICERS AND PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS FOR COMMUNITY BANKS 3
(2011), available at http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/examinations/supervisory/insights/
sise11/SI_SE2011.pdf.
46 Id. at 4.
41
42
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A recent report by the Treasury Department confirms that
large national banks are the worst offenders when it comes to
mortgage servicing. Of the mortgage servicers featured in the
report, only three will have their servicer incentives withheld,
because they needed substantial improvement and had no
mitigating factors sufficient to justify the disbursement of those
payments.47 All three are the servicing arms of national banks
regulated by the OCC.48
By comparison, the FDIC’s investigation found much better
behavior by state-supervised servicers. The FDIC investigated
state banks that are not members of the Federal Reserve System
to see if they engaged in “robo-signing” or the other deficient
practices found by the interagency review of the fourteen largest
federally regulated servicers. The FDIC reported that it did not
find “serious industry wide problems among state nonmember
banks,” and that “[t]o date, the review has not identified ‘robosigning’ or any other deficiencies that would warrant formal
enforcement actions.”49 In other words, the most egregious
servicer problems seem concentrated among federally rather
than state-regulated mortgage servicers.
While the states’ Attorneys General and federal agencies
report that they are finding significant evidence of widespread
servicer misconduct, they appear to disagree on what
punishment mortgage servicers should receive for their
misconduct.
The regulatory agency most concerned with
consumer protection, the “newly created Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau[,] is pushing for $20 billion or more in
penalties, backed up by the attorneys general and the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation . . . .”50 The traditional federal
bank regulators, the OCC, and the Federal Reserve Board,
reportedly claim that few borrowers were victims of wrongful
foreclosures, and so the fines should be much smaller.51 And so it
is possible that even after this apparently widespread misconduct
by servicers, they may receive the proverbial slap on the wrist.

47 See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE REPORT AND
SERVICER ASSESSMENTS FOR FIRST QUARTER 2011, at 16 (2011), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/results/MHAReports/Documents/April%202011%20MHA%20Report%20FINAL.PDF.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 5–6.
50 Nelson D. Schwartz & David Streitfeld, Officials Disagree on Penalties for
Mortgage Mess, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2011, at B1.
51 Id. at B1.

Do Not Delete

2011]

12/7/2011 2:22 PM

Foreclosing on the Federal Power Grab

183

In the midst of this servicer misconduct, the mortgage crisis
continues. One Federal Reserve governor recently noted that
foreclosures had rocketed from about one million in 2006 to 2.8
million in 2009, estimated that the final tallies in 2010 would be
about 2.25 million foreclosures, and predicted another two
million in 2012, with foreclosure levels thereafter expected to
“remain extremely high by historical standards.”52 Roughly a
third of the approximately two million homes that were in
foreclosure sit vacant.53 As of the end of 2010, “almost 5 million
mortgage loans [were] 90 days or more past due or in
foreclosure.”54 Adding to the foreclosure risk are the number of
American homeowners with negative equity in their homes, with
an estimated 15.7 million homeowners “underwater” at the end
of 2010, up nearly two million from just three months before and
representing twenty-seven percent of all single-family dwellings
with a mortgage.55 While foreclosures declined somewhat in
November of 2010, this decline “likely is due to voluntary
foreclosure suspensions put in place in the fall of 2010 in
response to the documentation irregularities situation” rather
than to any decline in defaults or greater loan modification
efforts.56
The primary federal response to the foreclosure crisis has
been the Making Home Affordable (MHA) program, announced in
February 2009 and initially intended to “help as many as 3 to 4
million financially struggling homeowners avoid foreclosure by
modifying loans . . . .”57 The primary component of MHA is the
Home Affordable Modification Program. While HAMP was
initially designed to modify a million loans per year from its start
in 2009, as of November 2010, it had produced fewer than
550,000 permanent loan modifications.58

52 Statement by Elizabeth A. Duke: Hearings Before the H. Fin. Servs. Subcomm. On
Hous. and Comty. Opportunity, 111th Cong. 5 (2010) (testimony of Elizabeth A. Duke,
Governor
of
the
Federal
Reserve
Board),
available
at
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/duke20101118a.htm.
53 See Schwartz & Streitfeld, supra note 50.
54 See Statement by Elizabeth Duke, supra note 52, at 5.
55 See John Gittelsohn, Negative Home Equity Rises, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Feb.
10, 2011, at A8.
56 See CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, 112TH CONG., MARCH OVERSIGHT REPORT 88–89
(2011), available at http://cop.senate.gov/reports/.
57 Home Affordable Modification Program: Overview, THE DEPARTMENT OF THE
TREASURY, https://www.hmpadmin.com/portal/programs/hamp.jsp (last visited May 11,
2011).
58 Making Home Affordable Program, THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY,
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/results/MHA-Reports/Documents/
Nov%202010%20MHA%20Report.pdf (last visited May 11, 2011).
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II. THE LACK OF EFFECTIVE FEDERAL REGULATION OF
MORTGAGE SERVICING
For too long, mortgage servicing has been relatively
unregulated, with no one agency given the task of overseeing
servicing and preventing abuses by servicers and no national
standards for servicer regulation. Federal regulation of mortgage
servicing has been, in the words of the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) “limited and fragmented.”59 Federal
law provides little protection for borrowers from abusive
servicing. Even federal regulators have bemoaned the lack of
national servicing standards and the need to develop them.60
While some have been arguing for national mortgage standards
for years, those calls have recently grown louder, and for good
reason, given servicer misbehavior.61
The primary federal law governing servicing is the Real
Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), which is designed to
inform borrowers when the servicing rights to their mortgage
have been transferred, to give them some disclosure of how that
transfer will affect them, and to provide some protection from
late fees during transfer.62 In addition, RESPA was intended to
prevent kickbacks and referral fees that can drive up the cost of
settlement services.63 Furthermore, RESPA allows borrowers to
seek some information regarding their loan’s payment history
and current status and requires servicers to respond to those
requests as well as requests that errors in the account be
corrected.
While RESPA can be useful for borrowers, its
usefulness is relatively limited as to protection from abusive
servicers and does not reach many of the current issues
embroiling the servicing industry.64

GAO DOCUMENTATION PROBLEMS REPORT, supra note 43, at 14.
GAO DOCUMENTATION PROBLEMS REPORT, supra note 43, at 54.
See Alan Zibel, Regulators Urged to Devise National Loan Servicing Standards,
WALL ST. J. BLOG (Dec. 21, 2010, 10:35 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/developments/
2010/12/21/regulators-urged-to-devise-national-loan-servicing-standards/ (reporting on a
letter signed by a group of academics, analysts, and investors urging the establishment of
a set of national standards for mortgage servicing).
62 See 12 U.S.C. § 2601(a)–(b) (2006).
63 See Patricia Quinn Robertson, Kickbacks, RESPA and the Title Insurance
Industry: How to Get a Foot in the (Courthouse) Door, 36 REAL EST. L.J. 270, 270 (2007)
(“Goals of RESPA include the provision of ‘more effective advance disclosure to home
buyers and sellers of settlement costs’ and ‘elimination of kickbacks or referral fees that
tend to increase unnecessarily the costs of certain settlement services.’” (quoting 12
U.S.C. § 2601(b)(1)–(2) (2000)).
64 See Adam J. Levitin & Tara Twomey, Mortgage Servicing, 28 YALE J. ON REG.
(2011) (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 7–8), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1324023 (noting the lack of rights RESPA grants to borrowers).
59
60
61
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Other federal laws regulating servicers also do little to quell
abusive practices by servicers. Until recently, the Truth in
Lending Act (TILA) affected servicers little. It was amended in
2009, however, to provide servicers some safe harbor from
liability to investors should servicers enter into loan
modifications with borrowers. The goal was to lessen the effect of
“tranche warfare,” whereby some investors could claim that their
individual interests were harmed by a loan modification, even if
the modification helped investors as a whole.65 While this
amendment gives servicers protection against some claims as
they modify loans, it does not give borrowers more leverage in
obtaining such loan modifications. Recent changes to Regulation
Z implementing TILA require prompt crediting of mortgage loan
payments and forbid charging late fees on unpaid late fees.66
While the existing statutory framework provides little
protection for borrowers from the improper fees, shoddy
paperwork, and unnecessary foreclosures that have marred the
mortgage servicing industry, some federal agencies have the
power to sanction servicers for such practices and have on
occasion used that power. For example, the Federal Trade
Commission has reached significant settlements with mortgage
servicers accused of abusive treatment of borrowers, including a
2003 settlement with Fairbanks Capital providing a $40 million
fund for injured borrowers, which included a set of “best
practice[s] guidelines for mortgage servicing,”67 a 2007
modification of that settlement with additional guidelines,68 a
2008 settlement for $28 million with Bear Stearns and its
servicers that included the establishment of a data integrity
system,69 and a settlement for $108 million with Countrywide’s
65 See Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-22, 123 Stat.
1638 (2009). For a discussion of this point, see Levitin & Twomey, supra note 64
(manuscript at 56). “Tranche warfare” is the battle between different classes (or
“tranches”) of investors who may have conflicting interests regarding whether a servicer
modifies or forecloses on a loan. For a description of tranche warfare, see Kurt Eggert,
Held Up in Due Course: Predatory Lending, Securitization, and the Holder in Due Course
Doctrine, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 503, 560–62 (2002).
66 See 12 C.F.R. § 226.36(c)(ii) (2008); Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. 44, 522 (July
30, 2008).
67 For a discussion of Fairbanks’ actions and the FTC litigation against Fairbanks,
see Kurt Eggert, Limiting Abuse and Opportunism by Mortgage Servicers, 15 HOUSING
POL’Y DEBATE 753, 761–67 (2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=992095.
68 See Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, FTC, Subprime Mortgage Servicer
Agree to Modified Settlement (Aug. 2, 2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2007/08/
sps.shtm (announcing the modification of a settlement between the FTC and Fairbanks
Capital which provides additional benefits to consumers).
69 See Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, Bear Stearns and EMC Mortgage
to Pay $28 Million to Settle FTC Charges of Unlawful Mortgage Servicing and Debt
Collection Practices (Sept. 9, 2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2008/09/emc.shtm

Do Not Delete

186

12/7/2011 2:22 PM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 15:1

loan servicing operation, which the FTC had accused of inflating
loan fees.70 While such actions are helpful and clearly necessary,
the FTC’s actions have been too limited to have a significant
effect on the servicing industry.
Furthermore, the FTC’s
authority does not extend to depository institutions themselves.71
Other federal agencies or quasi-federal organizations have
the authority to regulate servicing organizations but so far have
focused more on the safety and soundness of their regulated
institutions or on their own pecuniary gain than on preventing
servicer misbehavior that primarily damages borrowers.72
According to a recent GAO report, “federal banking regulators
have not regularly examined servicers’ foreclosure practices on a
loan-level basis.
Instead, previous federal regulatory
examinations of mortgage servicers have focused on loan
modifications or on the income banks earn from servicing
loans.”73
At a December 2010 Senate hearing, officials from the OCC,
the United States Department of the Treasury (Treasury), and
the Federal Housing Finance Agency, as well as a governor of the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, all testified
about problems in the mortgage and servicing industry.74 By and
large, they acknowledged that they had some authority over
mortgage servicing, that there was a significant problem with
mortgage servicing, and that they were currently investigating
the scope of the problem and hoped to have some idea soon how
widespread the problem was and what they could and should do
about it.75
It is telling that to a great extent this widespread servicer
abuse appears to have come as some surprise to these agencies,

(announcing settlement between FTC, Bear Stearns, and EMC Mortgage which requires
the installation of a data integrity program).
70 See Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, Countrywide Will Pay $108 Million
for Overcharging Struggling Homeowners: Loan Servicer Inflated Fees, Mishandled
Loans of Borrowers in Bankruptcy (June 7, 2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/
2010/06/countrywide.shtm (announcing $108 million settlement due to Countrywide’s
deceptive loan collection practices).
71 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 41, 45(a)(2) & 58 (2006).
72 See Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1,
92–93 (2008).
73 GAO DOCUMENTATION PROBLEMS REPORT, supra note 43, at 17.
74 For the written testimony of these federal regulators, as well as an archived
webcast of their oral testimony, see Problems in Mortgage Servicing from Modification to
Foreclosure, Part II, U.S. S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 111th Cong.
(2010),
http://banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Hearing&
Hearing_ID=ea6d7672-f492-4b1f-be71-b0b658b48bef.
75 Id.
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despite their power to investigate and regulate servicers. John
Walsh, Acting Comptroller of the Currency noted:
The OCC supervises all national banks and their operating
subsidiaries, including their mortgage servicing operations. The
servicing portfolios of the eight largest national bank mortgage
servicers account for approximately 63 percent of all mortgages
outstanding in the United States—nearly 33.3 million loans totaling
almost $5.8 trillion in principal balances as of June 30, 2010.76

The OCC is “the primary regulator for banks that service
78.3 percent of loans serviced by the top 25 servicers.”77 With
such broad supervisory powers over such a significant segment of
the servicing industry, the OCC should have been in a position to
monitor ongoing servicer behavior, to detect servicer misbehavior
as it happened, and to administer timely corrective measures,
including real sanctions for servicer misbehavior.
Unfortunately, however, the OCC appears to have had far
greater interest in preserving the powers of its client banks than
in protecting the borrowers/consumers affected by the servicing
operations of those banks. First of all, its primary mission is
protecting the safety and soundness of its regulated financial
institutions, and when the banks’ soundness seems threatened
by consumer protection, the OCC perpetually seems to opt
against consumer protection.78 Also, as much as ninety-five
percent of the OCC’s income comes from the banks that it
regulates, giving it a financial incentive to protect its client
banks.79 The OCC receives no Congressional funding, and so
depends on fees from banks, such as examination or application
fees.80
It appears that only recently has the OCC made any
significant investigation into foreclosure misconduct by servicers.
The OCC has acknowledged that until recently, it paid scant
attention to servicers’ foreclosure activities, abusive or not: “We
looked at the final stage of the process and thought of it as one

Id. (testimony of John Walsh, Acting Comptroller of the Currency).
GAO DOCUMENTATION PROBLEMS REPORT, supra note 43, at 17.
See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Written Testimony on the Credit Card Industry
Before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit of the House
Committee on Financial Services, April 26, 2007 13–20 (The George Washington Univ.
Law Sch. Pub. Law and Legal Theory Working Paper No. 517, 2007), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1729840 (noting how rarely the OCC has sanctioned any
national bank for a consumer protection violation, especially when compared to state
banking regulators).
79 See Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 72, at 93.
80 See About the OCC, OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY,
http://www.occ.gov/about/index-about.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2011).
76
77
78
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that would be governed by standards and procedures in internal
controls,” the OCC chief counsel stated.81 A GAO report on the
servicers and foreclosures noted, “[a]lthough various federal
agencies have authority to oversee most mortgage servicers, past
oversight of their foreclosure activities has been limited, in part
because banking regulators did not consider these practices as
posing a high risk to banks’ safety and soundness . . . .”82
After the robo-signing affair reached the news, the OCC and
other federal agencies with banking oversight announced with
great fanfare an investigation into the practices of their
regulated servicers. They claimed that they sent teams of
investigators to pour over the books of the servicers and review
their practices, and issued a report that showed that their
investigators had discovered “significant problems in foreclosure
processing at the servicers” though also that “borrowers subject
to foreclosure in the reviewed files were seriously delinquent on
their loans.”83
This report itself disclosed how minimal the inspection of
servicers by the federal agencies was, however.
The
investigation seemed to rely primarily on servicers’ selfassessment, as examiners reviewed only “approximately 2,800
borrower foreclosure files” from the two year period ending in
December 2010, or about 200 files at each of the fourteen
servicers.84 Even the federal examiners noted that this was “a
relatively small number of foreclosure files given the volume of
recent foreclosures processed by these servicers . . . .”85 The
reviewers did not examine the “entire cycle of the borrowers’
loans or potential mortgage-servicing issues outside of the
foreclosure process,” and so would have missed foreclosures
caused by earlier servicer errors.86 The report acknowledges that
“examiners may not have uncovered cases of misapplied
payments or unreasonable fees, particularly when these actions
occurred prior to the default,” leaving one to wonder what the
examiners were looking for if not those basic elements of servicer

81 Zachary A. Goldfarb, Regulators Lagged in Foreclosure Oversight, WASH. POST,
Nov. 8, 2010, at A1.
82 GAO DOCUMENTATION PROBLEMS REPORT, supra note 43.
83 FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY &
OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION, Interagency Review of Foreclosure Policies and Practices,
1, 3 (Apr. 2011), available at www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/rptcongress/interagency_
review_foreclosures_20110413.pdf [hereinafter INTERAGENCY REVIEW].
84 INTERAGENCY REVIEW, supra note 83, at 1.
85 GAO DOCUMENTATION PROBLEMS REPORT, supra note 43, at 25.
86 INTERAGENCY REVIEW, supra note 83, at 3.

Do Not Delete

2011]

12/7/2011 2:22 PM

Foreclosing on the Federal Power Grab

189

abuse.87 The FDIC, in a follow-up report, noted how minimal the
interagency examination of servicers was, stating that the
examination “did not review allegations of improper servicing or
loss mitigation, such as misapplied payments, unreasonable fees,
inappropriate force-placing of insurance, failure to consider
adequately a borrower for loan modification, or requiring a
borrower to be delinquent to qualify for a loan modification.”88
After this minimal investigation, the federal agencies
decreed a minimal enforcement action against the servicers,
requiring them mostly to “[r]etain an independent firm to
conduct a review of residential foreclosure actions that were
pending” during the same time period as the federal agencies’
review “to determine any financial injury to borrowers caused by
errors” by the servicers’ misbehavior “and to remediate, as
appropriate . . . .”89 Servicers are also required to hire a firm to
conduct risk assessment for the servicers. In other words, the
federal agencies punted their investigation and oversight role to
a firm to be hired by each servicer, leaving open the possibility, if
not likelihood, that servicers will choose oversight firms that
signal a willingness to protect the interests of the servicer itself,
rather than the borrowers. Worse yet, the “independent reviews”
will not be made public, according to the OCC, so that the public
cannot determine whether the reviews have any validity.90
The remainder of the agencies’ enforcement order is akin to
ordering the servicers to come up with better policies and get
back to the agencies to let the agencies know what the servicers
had done, with little indication what will happen if the servicers’
proposed changes do not meet federal approval. Worse yet,
federal regulators have not indicated any intention to increase
their oversight of servicers following this review. As noted by a
GAO report, “[a]lthough regulators have taken enforcement
actions against servicers, they have not identified specifically

Id.
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Regulatory Actions Related to Foreclosure
Activities by Large Servicers and Practical Implications for Community Banks,
SUPERVISORY INSIGHTS, May 2011, at 4, available at http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/
examinations/supervisory/insights/sise11/SI_SE2011.pdf.
89 FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM ET AL., INTERAGENCY REVIEW OF FORECLOSURE
POLICIES AND PRACTICES 13 (Apr. 2011), available at www.federalreserve.gov/
boarddocs/rptcongress/interagency_review_foreclosures_20110413.pdf.
90 Jon Prior, Independent Reviews in Mortgage Servicer Consent Orders to Stay
Sealed, HOUSINGWIRE, May 13, 2011, http://www.housingwire.com/2011/05/13/
independent-reviews-in-mortgage-servicer-consent-orders-to-stay-sealed.
87
88
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how they will change the extent and frequency of future
oversight of servicers going forward.”91
Given the lackadaisical attitude that the OCC and other
federal regulators have demonstrated toward servicer
misbehavior, it is reasonable to worry that the OCC and others
are using their purported investigation of, and enforcement
action against, servicers merely as a way to stall for time, and
will not take meaningful action to deter and punish servicer
misbehavior. Instead, the OCC and other federal regulators may
well still be acting primarily to protect bank/servicers’ financial
soundness and their own turf as banking regulators, to the
detriment of homeowners and borrowers.
Another part of the mortgage servicing problem is the role of
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in overseeing servicers, and their
self-interest in performing those roles. Fannie and Freddie,
quasi-governmental bodies with their own pecuniary interests at
stake, have been given much of the task of regulating servicer
conduct, both directly for the loans they have purchased or
guaranteed, and through the HAMP program.92
Treasury
granted Fannie and Freddie this power by entering into contracts
with them to oversee HAMP.93 Under those contracts, Fannie
Mae was designated as the point of contact for servicers that
participate in HAMP, not only to pay them for their HAMP
modifications, but also to instruct them how loans should be
modified.94 Fannie Mae was also supposed to “help design and
execute a program that implements standardized, streamlined
mortgage modifications for all types of servicers, regardless of the
risk holder . . . and that lowers monthly payments for qualified
borrowers.”95
Freddie Mac, on the other hand, was hired by Treasury to be
its program compliance agent, to examine and investigate
mortgage servicers to ensure that servicers comply with the

GAO DOCUMENTATION PROBLEMS REPORT, supra note 43, at 31.
See Henry E. Hildebrand III, HAMP and Your Chapter 13 Practice, 29 AM. BANKR.
INST. J. 12, 74 n.8 (2010) (“Loans that are owned or guaranteed by Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac must be examined for HAMP modification. Loans that are owned by others
are encouraged to participate by contract.”).
93 See Theresa R. DiVenti, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: Past, Present, and Future,
11 CITYSCAPE: J. OF POL’Y DEV. & RES. 231, 232 (2009).
94 U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL AGENCY AGREEMENT FOR A
HOMEOWNERSHIP PRESERVATION PROGRAM UNDER THE EMERGENCY STABILIZATION ACT
OF 2008, EXHIBIT A 1–2 (2009), available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financialstability/about/procurement/faa/Financial_Agency_Agreements/Fannie%20Mae%20FAA%
20021809.pdf.
95 Id. at 1.
91
92
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published rules of HAMP and to report to Treasury the results of
its investigations.96 Freddie Mac was given the authority to
conduct on-site audits of servicers and, in consultation with
Treasury, require certain corrective measures by servicers, such
as suspending foreclosures. Treasury, through the actions of its
MHA Compliance Committee, could impose penalties on
servicers that fail to comply with their HAMP obligations, such
as withholding or requiring repayment of incentive payments.97
Treasury has failed to use this power to any significant extent,
however. According to the Congressional Oversight Panel’s
December 2010 report, “Treasury has seemed reluctant to do
more than vaguely threaten the potential for clawbacks of HAMP
payments. Despite rampant anecdotal stories of servicer errors,
to date, no servicer has experienced a clawback or other financial
repercussion.”98 The Treasury Department recently announced
that the three worst offending mortgage servicers would suffer
some financial repercussion, though it is not clear how significant
these penalties will be. After finding that four of the nation’s
largest servicers were in need of substantial improvement to
conform to HAMP guidelines, Treasury announced, “[b]eginning
this month, Treasury will withhold servicer incentives owed to
three of the four servicers requiring substantial improvement
until those servicers make certain identified improvements.”99
Thus, even though Treasury’s report indicates that the largest
servicers needed significant improvement, its only punishment
was to withhold some payments until that improvement occurs,
when presumably the servicers will be made whole.100
It has become apparent that Fannie and Freddie performed
their oversight function poorly, likely in large part because their
own financial interests conflict with regulating servicer behavior
to protect borrowers from abusive practices. The Congressional
Oversight Panel (Panel) has noted Fannie and Freddie’s self-

96 See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL AGENCY AGREEMENT FOR A
HOMEOWNERSHIP PRESERVATION PROGRAM UNDER THE EMERGENCY STABILIZATION ACT
OF 2008, EXHIBIT A 1–2 (2009), available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financialstability/about/procurement/faa/Financial_Agency_Agreements/freddie%
20mac%20financial%20agency%20agreement.pdf.
97 See CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, 111TH CONG., DECEMBER OVERSIGHT REPORT 50
(2010), available at http://cybercemetery.unt.edu/archive/cop/20110402010243/http://
cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-121410-report.pdf.
98 Id. at 50.
99 See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE REPORT AND
SERVICER ASSESSMENTS FOR FIRST QUARTER 2011, at 16 (2011), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/results/MHA-Reports/Documents/
April%202011%20MHA%20Report%20FINAL.PDF.
100 Id.
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interest in overseeing HAMP, and how that self-interest may
limit Freddie’s willingness to engage in aggressive oversight of
mortgage servicers. Regarding Freddie Mac, the Panel reported:
In response to revelations that servicers have been using “robosigners” to submit false affidavits in thousands of foreclosure cases,
Freddie Mac noted that . . . [t]rying to enforce Freddie Mac
contractual rights, however, “may negatively impact our relationships
with these seller/servicers, some of which are among our largest
sources of mortgage loans.”101

Also weakening the oversight of mortgage servicers has been
the voluntary nature of this HAMP oversight. While it is not
clear what the servicers’ rights are, some have been concerned
that if Treasury through Fannie and Freddie were to crack down
on servicer behavior, then servicers would attempt to leave the
HAMP program to avoid sanction.102 As a result of this lack of
oversight, servicers often have acted as if they were free to
violate or simply ignore the HAMP guidelines intended to
promote loan modifications.103
Because of the great weakness of the current regulation of
mortgage servicers, it seems clear that a new system of national
mortgage servicer regulation is in order to provide a floor of
regulation below which servicers cannot go. A natural agency to
draft such regulations would be the new Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau, to be established as mandated by the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. While
this Bureau is now ramping up, however, it is not clear how soon
it will be in a position to draft national servicing regulations and
to enforce them once it officially opens for business in July 2011.
III. FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF STATE REGULATION
While states wait for federal action on mortgage servicer
regulation, they could take action on their own. However, to a
great extent, state servicer regulation has been hampered by the
101 See DECEMBER OVERSIGHT REPORT, supra note 97, at 82. The Panel added that
“[t]he Panel condemns this sentiment. If Freddie Mac is hesitant to jeopardize their
relationships with servicers to enforce their rights in their own book of business, it is
reasonable to worry that they may be similarly unwilling to risk these relationships on
Treasury’s behalf by aggressively overseeing HAMP servicers.” Id.
102 See id. at 51, 87 n.330.
103 See Problems in Mortgage Servicing From Modification to Foreclosure: Hearing
Before the U.S. S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 3 (2010)
(testimony of Diane E. Thompson), available at http://banking.senate.gov/public/
index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&FileStore_id=c1fac0f6-5ac5-4ae5-85cc-e2220255dfd9
(“Advocates continue to report that borrowers are denied improperly for HAMP, that
servicers solicit opt-outs from HAMP, and that some servicers persistently disregard
HAMP applications.”).
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fact that many of the largest mortgage servicers are parts of
federally regulated financial institutions and have been able to
claim that state regulation over them is preempted.104
Preemption of state law by federal law or regulation comes in
many varieties, with the touchstone of all forms being the
purpose of Congress.105 Preemption doctrine has a long and
tortured history, with courts and academics grappling with its
challenges more or less successfully through the years.106
Generally, preemption analysis starts with the “assumption that
the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded
by the [federal law] unless that was the clear and manifest
purpose of Congress.”107 Preemption can be expressly stated or
implied by statute.108 Preemption implied by statute can either
be through conflict preemption, where state law conflicts with
federal law, or field preemption, “where Congress has legislated
so comprehensively in a field that it must have intended national
uniformity of regulation, and, therefore, its legislation displaces
all state regulation” without regard to whether there is a specific
conflict with federal law.109 Another way of describing field
preemption is that state law is preempted “where the scheme of
federal regulation is so pervasive as to make reasonable the
inference that there is no room for state action.”110
Conflict preemption has two distinct types: (1) direct conflict
preemption, where state and federal law directly contradict each
other such that it would be impossible to comply with both; and

104 The OCC oversees over sixty percent of mortgage servicing. See Problems in
Mortgage Servicing From Modification to Foreclosure, Part II: Hearing Before the U.S. S.
Comm. On Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 13 (2010) (testimony of John
Walsh, Acting Comptroller of the Currency), available at http://banking.senate.gov/public/
index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&FileStore_id=c1fac0f6-5ac5-4ae5-85cc-e2220255dfd9.
105 See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 494 (1996) (“‘[T]he purpose of Congress
is the ultimate touchstone’ in every pre-emption case.” (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Grp.,
505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992)).
106 For useful articles on the history and development of preemption doctrine, see
Mary J. Davis, The Battle over Implied Preemption: Products Liability and the FDA, 48
B.C. L. REV. 1089 (2007); Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 GEO. L.J.
2085, 2112–17 (2000); Karen A. Jordan, The Shifting Preemption Paradigm: Conceptual
and Interpretive Issues, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1149 (1998); Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA.
L. REV. 225, 298 (2000).
107 Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1946). See also Jones v. Rath
Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525–604 (1977) (“‘[W]e start with the assumption that the
historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by [federal law] unless that
was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.’” (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1946)).
108 See Mary J. Davis, The “New” Presumption Against Preemption, 61 HASTINGS L.J.
1217, 1220–21 (2010).
109 Id. at 1221.
110 Conference of Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’ns v. Stein, 604 F.2d 1256, 1260 (9th Cir.
1979) (citing Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 157 (1978)).
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(2) preemption where the state law is “an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives
of Congress.”111 Direct conflict preemption, where it is impossible
to comply with both federal and state law, is a rarity, however.112
Therefore, courts attempting to apply conflict preemption
typically grapple with the issue of whether state law or
regulation is a sufficient obstacle to federal law or regulation that
it should be preempted.
In addition to preemption through federal statute, state law
can also be preempted by the action of federal regulatory
agencies.113 “Federal regulations have no less pre-emptive effect
than federal statutes.”114 Also, agencies may attempt to preempt
state law either through express statements of preemption or by
enacting regulations that conflict with existing state law.115 If
the scheme of agency regulation of an area is so pervasive as to
leave no room for state action, then field preemption is implied.116
However, it would upset the balance of federalism to assume
blanket preemption simply because of extensive regulation of an
area.117 Because Congressional purpose is the touchstone of
preemption, agency power to preempt must come from Congress,
which may grant agencies preemption power either directly,
stating that agencies have the power to make preemption
declarations, or indirectly, giving agencies the power to take
actions which, through their conflict with state law, preempt
those laws.118
A crucial question, and one subject to much current debate,
is whether and how much deference courts should give to agency
declarations and decisions regarding the preemptive effects of

Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
See Davis, supra note 106, at 1244.
See William Funk, Judicial Deference and Regulatory Preemption by Federal
Agencies, 84 TUL. L. REV. 1233, 1235–36 (2010). Recognition of agencies’ preemptive
effect on state law goes back, some argue, at least to Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (9
Wheat.) (1824). See Funk, at 1234–35.
114 Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’ns. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982).
115 See Funk, supra note 113, at 1235.
116 Rice Bank of Am. v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 309 F.3d 551, 558 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
117 See John P.C. Duncan, The Course of Federal Pre-emption of State Banking Law,
18 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 221, 317–18 (1999) (“To infer pre-emption whenever an agency
deals with a problem comprehensively is virtually tantamount to saying that whenever a
federal agency decides to step into a field, its regulations will be exclusive. Such a rule, of
course, would be inconsistent with the federal-state balance embodied in our Supremacy
Clause jurisprudence.”).
118 See Funk, supra note 113, at 1235–36 (explaining how agency regulations may
expressly preempt state law or may have the effect of doing so).
111
112
113
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their actions.119 Agencies that seek the greatest latitude in
preempting state law would prefer that their preemption
decisions be given Chevron deference, a standard which requires
greater administrative procedure to establish a regulation, but
provides an agency with greater deference to its determination,
so long as it is reasonable.120 A lesser standard is Skidmore
deference, which requires less daunting administrative procedure
to establish a regulation, but leaves greater discretion to courts
to determine preemption.121 Some academic commentators have
urged against granting federal agencies Chevron deference
regarding their preemption determinations, arguing, among
other things, that federal agencies lack expertise on the effects of
preemption, or that agencies lack sufficient political
accountability in their consideration of states’ interests.122
Others have urged courts to take a “hard look” at agency
declarations of preemption not grounded in express powers
granted by Congress.123
In the 2009 case, Wyeth v. Levine, the Supreme Court
indicated that in determining whether state law conflicts with
federal regulation, courts should not defer “to an agency’s
conclusion that state law is pre-empted” but instead should
attend to the agency’s explanation of any such conflict.124 The
Court noted that, absent delegation of preemption powers by
Congress, federal agencies possess no inherent “authority to
pronounce on pre-emption,” though they do “have a unique
understanding of the statutes they administer and an attendant

119 See, e.g., Nina A. Mendelson, A Presumption Against Agency Preemption, 102 NW.
U. L. REV. 695, 699, 702–03 (2008) (arguing that federal agencies are poorly suited to
make preemption decisions, given their “particular stake in validating their own policy
decisions,” their lack of stake in protecting state autonomy, and the likelihood that
agencies would extend preemption of state law far beyond that intended by Congress).
120 See Brian Galle & Mark Seidenfeld, Administrative Law’s Federalism:
Preemption, Delegation, and Agencies at the Edge of Federal Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 1933,
1998 & n.268 (2008) (explaining that agency decisions made after formal procedures, such
as notice and comment, will receive great deference by the courts).
121 See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 164 (1944). For a discussion of
Skidmore deference, see Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 120, at 1998 & n.268.
122 See, e.g., Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REV. 737,
758–98 (2004) (arguing against Chevron deference for agency preemption determinations
given their lack of expertise regarding the effects of such preemption, and discussing
alternative theories regarding agency political accountability).
123 Karen A. Jordan, Opening the Door to “Hard-Look” Review of Agency Preemption,
31 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 353, 359 (2009). The author argues that while appearing
deferential to agency preemption decisions, the Supreme Court in United States v.
Shimer, 367 U.S. 374 (1961), was actually mandating “a hard-look review [that] requires
a court to search for the rationale and reasoning underlying the agency’s decision.” See id.
at 361.
124 Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1201 (2009).
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ability to make informed determinations about how state
requirements may pose an ‘obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.’”125
How much deference to grant agency claims of preemption has
become a crucial issue in the banking industry, because federal
banking regulators have made extensive claims that their
regulation preempts the powers of the states to govern banks’
activities.
A The Previous Co-Existence of State and Federal
Regulation of National Banks and Thrifts
Many statutes come into play in the effect of federal
preemption on the banking industry.126 Two sets of statutes and
regulators are central to the federal preemption for national
banks and thrifts: (1) the National Bank Act (NBA), which
charters national banks that are overseen by the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency; and (2) the Home Owners Loan Act
(HOLA), which charters Federal Savings associations (also
known as “thrifts”), that are currently supervised by the Office of
Thrift Supervision.127
For many decades since the enactment of the NBA in 1863–
1864 and HOLA in 1933, these statutes were construed to
recognize the importance of the dual federal and state banking
system, as well as the extensive role that state law plays in the
operation even of federally regulated banks and thrifts.128 Both
the courts and Congress were concerned about preserving the
“competitive equality” of the dual state and federal banking
system and so strove to keep them on at least somewhat equal

Id. (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
Among the federal statutes with the most significant preemptive effect in the
mortgage industry are: the National Bank Act of 1864, 12 U.S.C. §§ 21–216 (2006); Home
Owners’ Loan Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461–70 (2006); Depository Institutions Deregulation and
Monetary Control Act of 1980, 12 U.S.C. § 1735f (2006); National Credit Union
Administration, 12 U.S.C. § 1757 (2006); and the Alternative Mortgage Transactions
Parity Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3801–06 (2006). For a more complete description of various
federal laws preempting state law in the mortgage and banking industry, see ELIZABETH
RENUART & KATHLEEN E. KEEST, THE COST OF CREDIT: REGULATION, PREEMPTION, AND
INDUSTRY ABUSES 53–55 (4th ed. 2009).
127 In addition, there is the Federal Credit Union Act (FCUA) providing for credit
unions supervised by the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA). However, as
credit unions do not loom large in the mortgage meltdown or its aftermath, the NCUA
will be little discussed herein.
128 For an extensive discussion of the history of preemption in the banking industry,
see generally Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The OCC’s Preemption Rules Exceed the Agency’s
Authority and Present a Serious Threat to the Dual Banking System and Consumer
Protection, 23 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 225 (2004).
125
126
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footing.129 On the other hand, national banks and thrifts and
federal regulators have vociferously argued that because the
federal government has always played a significant role in the
regulation of the banking industry, and a dominant one for
national banks, there should be no presumption against
preemption of state law as to national banks.130
Notably, NBA and HOLA are virtually silent regarding
whether they preempt state law. The NBA has only one direct
assertion of preemption in its text, which is the provision that
national banks can abide by either state usury limits or,
alternatively, a federal one.131 The Supreme Court has never
held that the NBA occupies the field of law generally regarding
regulation of national banks, even though it does occupy the field
regarding usury claims.132
The Supreme Court commented on the great role state law
plays in governing national banks in 1869, stating that national
banks:
are subject to the laws of the State, and are governed in their daily
course of business far more by the laws of the State than of the nation.
All their contracts are governed and construed by State laws. Their
acquisition and transfer of property, their right to collect their debts,
and their liability to be sued for debts, are all based on State law. It is
only when the State law incapacitates the [national] banks from
discharging their duties to the [federal] government that it becomes
unconstitutional.133

Traditionally, therefore, national banks’ “right to collect
their debts,” which is the core of servicing, is “based on State
law.”
Decades later, the Court reemphasized the role state law
plays in regulating national banks and rejected the idea of field
preemption by federal regulation in St. Louis v. Missouri.134 In
1978, however, the Court extended the reach of the NBA’s usury

129 Duncan, supra note 117, at 222 (‘“Competitive equality’ became shorthand in the
courts for the complex state-federal balances created by federal banking statutes.”).
130 See United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108 (2000).
131 See Lauren K. Saunders, Restore the States’ Traditional Role as “First Responder,”
NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, at 4–5 (Sept. 2009), http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/
preemption/restore-the-role-of-states-2009.pdf.
132 See Duncan, supra note 117, at 223. See also RENUART & KEEST, supra note 126,
at 84 & nn.273–74 (citing Jefferson v. Chase Home Fin., No. C 06-6510 THE, 2008 WL
1883484 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 29, 2008), for the proposition that the NBA does not occupy the
field of banking, and Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1 (2003), which applies
express preemption language to usury claims).
133 See Nat’l Bank v. Kentucky, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 353, 362 (1869).
134 See St. Louis v. Missouri, 263 U.S. 640, 656–61 (1924).
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preemption by holding that national banks had “most favored
lender” status in their respective home states and decreed that
national banks could export their own home states’ usury limits
to other states in which they do business.135
In 1994, Congress appeared to attempt to rein in preemption
claims by the OCC when, during the enactment of the RiegleNeal Act, it directed the OCC, as well as courts, to try to
harmonize state and federal law where possible, rather than
finding preemption-causing conflict, noting that the OCC should
not decide that a state law is preempted unless “the legal basis is
compelling and the Federal policy interest is clear.”136 Since
preemption is based on and reflects Congressional intent, clear
direction such as this should be a guidepost to limit the extent of
preemption caused by OCC regulations.
In 1996, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Barnett
Bank of Marion County v. Nelson, which laid out the Court’s view
of the preemption effects of federal banking law.137 In Barnett, a
national bank sued Florida’s Department of Insurance, seeking
to enjoin it from enforcing a state statute that prohibited some
banks from selling many varieties of insurance, arguing that this
statute was preempted by a 1916 federal statute that provided
that banks may sell insurance in certain instances.138 The
Supreme Court held that because the federal law granted
national banks a power, in this case to sell insurance, that grant
of power preempted a state law that would deny such power.139
However, the Court noted that national banks are still subject to
state regulation and provided a standard by which to determine
whether state law should be preempted by the NBA and OCC
regulation:
In defining the pre-emptive scope of statutes and regulations granting
a power to national banks, these cases take the view that normally
Congress would not want States to forbid, or to impair significantly,
the exercise of a power that Congress explicitly granted. To say this is
not to deprive States of the power to regulate national banks, where

135

(1978).

See Marquette Nat’l Bank v. First Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299, 314 & n.26

136 H.R. REP. NO. 103-651, at 53–55 (1994) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2074.
137 See Barnett Bank of Marion Cnty. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 27–28 (1996).
138 See id. at 28–29. The federal statute in question was the Act of Sept. 7, 1916
(Federal Statute). See 12 U.S.C. § 92 (2006).
139 See Barnett, 517 U.S. at 37 (“[W]e conclude that the Federal Statute means to
grant small town national banks authority to sell insurance, whether or not a State
grants its own state banks or national banks similar approval.”).
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(unlike here) doing so does not prevent or significantly interfere with
the national bank’s exercise of its powers.140

This case therefore lays out what the Supreme Court, in
1996, viewed as the appropriate preemption standard for state
regulation of national banks. States do have the power to
regulate national banks so long as their regulation does not
“prevent or significantly interfere with the national
bank’s . . . powers” or does not “forbid or . . . impair significantly,
the exercise of a power that Congress [has] explicitly granted.”141
Congress explicitly adopted the Barnett standard by citing it in
subsequent legislation.142
Like the NBA, HOLA, which governs thrifts, has only very
limited preemption language, also specifying that thrifts can
choose between state and federal usury limits, and specifying the
federal thrift usury limit.143 Because HOLA and the NBA have
such limited preemption language, courts have generally applied
the narrower “conflict” preemption analysis to determine if state
laws purporting to regulate national banks and thrifts were
preempted, rather than the broader field preemption.144 For
example, in the 1986 case Departmento de Asuntos del
Consumidor(DACO) v. Oriental Federal Saving Bank, a federal
district court employed a conflict preemption analysis in finding
that local law setting interest rate maximums for retail
installment contracts was not preempted, and in doing so
rejected the argument that HOLA necessarily preempted local
law by occupying the field.145 That court stated that, despite the
fact that HOLA grants the thrift regulator broad powers, which it
has used to issue “detailed regulations covering all aspects of
every federal savings and loan association ‘from its cradle to its

See id. at 33.
Id.
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 limits the states’ ability to restrict
depository institutions or their affiliates from engaging “in any insurance sales,
solicitation, or crossmarketing activity” and expressly states that this limitation is in
“accordance with the legal standards for preemption set forth in the decision of the
Supreme Court of the United States in Barnett Bank of Marion County . . . .” 15 U.S.C.
§ 6701(d)(2)(A) (2006).
143 See 12 U.S.C. § 1463 (2006). For a discussion of this point see Adam J. Levitin,
Hydraulic Regulation: Regulating Credit Markets Upstream, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 143, 167
(2009) (noting that except as to national thrifts, HOLA contains no explicit language
preempting state law).
144 In 1982, in finding “an actual conflict between federal and state law,” the Supreme
Court held that it “need not decide whether the HOLA or the Board’s regulations occupy
the . . . entire field of federal savings and loan regulation.” Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass’n v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 159 n.14 (1982).
145 Departmento de Asuntos del Consumidor (DACO) v. Oriental Fed. Sav., 648 F.
Supp. 1194, 1197 (D.P.R. 1986).
140
141
142
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grave,’ . . . .most courts have been unwilling to blanketly declare
that Congress has occupied the entire field of federal savings and
loan association regulation.”146 Another court in 1982 opined in
discussing HOLA and its accompanying regulations: “The fact
that federal statutes or regulations covering some aspects of a
regulated area are, by necessity, complex and detailed, does not
imply that Congress intended to occupy the entire field to the
exclusion of state law.”147
B. Federal Regulators Move to Preempt State Regulation of
Nation Banks and Thrifts
During the 1980s, as federal “regulatory zeal” declined and
states stepped up their regulatory efforts, preemption, which had
been a backwater of American law, suddenly gained new
importance.148
Various industries sought to stifle state
regulation by seeking federal preemption, so as to trump state
action with federal inaction in regulation.149 In the banking
industry, banks and thrifts increasingly sought protection from
state regulation by appealing to federal regulators to assert
greater preemptive powers.150
The OTS struck first in 1996 by issuing regulations claiming
that it had the authority to occupy the field regarding any
regulation of federal thrifts.151 Its regulation stated, “[p]ursuant
to sections 4(a) and 5(a) of the HOLA, 12 U.S.C. 1463(a), 1464(a),
OTS is authorized to promulgate regulations that preempt state
laws affecting the operations of federal savings associations . . . .
OTS hereby occupies the entire field of lending regulation for
federal savings associations.”152 The regulation provides specific
illustrations of state law that is preempted, and includes:
“Processing, origination, servicing, sale or purchase of, or

146

1951)).

Id. (quoting Cal. v. Coast Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 98 F. Supp. 311, 316 (S.D. Cal.

147 Morse v. Mutual Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Whitman, 536 F. Supp. 1271, 1280 (D.
Mass. 1982).
148 Susan Bartlett Foote, Administrative Preemption: An Experiment in Regulatory
Federalism, 70 VA. L. REV. 1429, 1430–31 (1984).
149 Id. (“Until recently, administrative preemption provisions attracted little political,
judicial, or scholarly attention. . . . In the last few years, however, the federal government
has declined in regulatory zeal, and states and localities have become more protective.
Faced with stricter state laws varying from state to state, businesses have begun to lobby
for uniform federal regulations that would preempt more protective state laws.” (footnotes
omitted)).
150 See Julia Patterson Forrester, Still Mortgaging the American Dream: Predatory
Lending, Preemption, and Federally Supported Lenders, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1303, 1309
(2006).
151 12 C.F.R. § 560.2 (2011).
152 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(a) (2010) (original version at 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(a) (1997)).
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investment or participation in, mortgages.”153 Therefore, with a
single regulation, the OTS claimed to eliminate any state power
to regulate thrifts engaged not only in lending, but also in
servicing loans on behalf of others.
The OTS did note some exceptions to its claimed field
preemption in this regulation, preserving state contract law, real
property law, tort and criminal law, and any law that “[f]urthers
a vital state interest,” among others, but only “to the extent that
they only incidentally affect the lending operations of Federal
savings associations or are otherwise consistent with the
purposes of paragraph (a) of this section.”154 The OTS made clear
that these exceptions to preemption were meant merely to
“preserve the traditional infrastructure of basic state laws that
undergird commercial transactions, not to open the door to state
regulation of lending by federal savings associations.”155
Furthermore, any exception is “intended to be interpreted
narrowly.
Any doubt should be resolved in favor of
preemption.”156
The OTS based its field preemption claim on two sections of
federal statute, “sections 4(a) and 5(a) of the HOLA, 12 U.S.C.
1463(a), 1464(a).”157 However, these sections are essentially
silent as to any explicit Congressional purpose to grant the OTS
the power to preempt. 12 U.S.C. § 1463(a) provides that the
OTS, through its director, can issue regulations.158 12 U.S.C. §
1464(a) provides that the Director of the OTS can, under
regulations the Director prescribes, “provide for the organization,
incorporation, examination, operation, and regulation of [Federal
savings] associations” and to issue charters for them.159 Neither
provides any expression that Congress’ purpose was to have the
OTS occupy the field regarding regulation of thrifts, unless one

12 C.F.R. § 560.2(b)(10) (emphasis added).
12 C.F.R. § 560.2(c). The OTS gave courts instructions on how to apply the
preemption doctrine in section 560.2, stating that “[w]hen analyzing the status of state
laws under § 560.2, the first step will be to determine whether the type of law in question
is listed in paragraph (b). If so, the analysis will end there; the law is preempted. If the
law is not covered by paragraph (b), the next question is whether the law affects lending.
If it does, then, in accordance with paragraph (a), the presumption arises that the law is
preempted. This presumption can be reversed only if the law can clearly be shown to fit
within the confines of paragraph (c). For these purposes, paragraph (c) is intended to be
interpreted narrowly. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of preemption.” Lending and
Investment, 61 Fed. Reg. 50,951, 50,966–67 (Sept. 30, 1996).
155 Lending and Investment, 61 Fed. Reg. at 50,966.
156 Id. at 50,966–67.
157 12. C.F.R. § 560.2(a).
158 12 U.S.C. § 1463(a) (2006).
159 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a).
153
154
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takes the position that anytime Congress allows a federal agency
to draft regulations, its purpose is to have that agency occupy the
field, or that federal agencies directed to regulate an area can
merely announce that their regulations occupy the field for that
area.
The OTS, somewhat disingenuously, stated in its
announcement of the regulations that its preemption regulation
did not constitute a change in the law, but merely a clearer
restatement of it, arguing that the regulation merely
restates long-standing preemption principles applicable to federal
savings associations, as reflected in earlier regulations, court cases,
and numerous legal opinions issued by OTS and the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board (FHLBB), OTS’s predecessor agency. OTS still
intends to occupy the field of lending regulation for federal savings
associations.160

After the OTS issued regulations purportedly preempting
the field of thrift regulation, it was perhaps nearly inevitable
that the OCC would do the same for the regulation of national
banks. While thrifts and national banks might appear to be
different types of entities, in fact the OTS and the OCC were in
competition, both with each other and with state regulators, over
subject financial institutions.161 Should the OTS be free to
provide its member thrifts freedom from state regulation and the
OCC not, then banks would be tempted to switch from being
either state chartered institutions or national banks to being
national thrifts in order to reduce their regulatory burden, thus
starting a “race to the bottom” to see which regulator would
mandate the fewest consumer protections and other
regulations.162 Like that of OTS, the budget of the OCC
depended largely on fees from the financial institutions it
regulated, giving the agencies an incentive to maintain or
increase the number of institutions they regulated, and making
preemption a valuable tool to lure those institutions away from
state charters.163 Without broad preemption powers, the OCC
was no doubt concerned that not only could it not lure banks
away from state charters, but that the OTS might lure them into
becoming thrifts. The OCC was constrained by the fact that the
Supreme Court had, in 1996, stated the standards for preemption
governing national banks in the Barnett case, and Congress had

Lending and Investment, 61 Fed. Reg. at 50,952.
Duncan, supra note 117, at 318.
Id.
Patricia A. McCoy et al., Systemic Risk Through Securitization: The Result of
Deregulation and Regulatory Failure, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1327, 1349 (2009).
160
161
162
163
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subsequently expressed approval of those standards, as noted
above.164 However, the OCC brushed such concerns aside.165
In 2003, the OCC fired a salvo against state regulation of
national banks, issuing a preemption order finding that the
Georgia Fair Lending Act, designed to deter predatory lending,
did not apply to national banks.166 In 2004, the OCC moved to
preempt state regulation more universally and issued regulations
purporting to preempt state law generally in the business of
banking for national banks, including for deposit-taking and
lending, either with or without mortgages.167
The OCC’s
regulation went far beyond the existing Barnett standard,
whereby state law was preempted as to national banks only to
the extent it would “forbid, or to impair significantly” or “prevent
or significantly interfere with the national bank’s exercise of its
powers.”168 Instead, the OCC regulation declared any state law
that would “obstruct, impair, or condition, a national bank’s
ability to fully exercise” its powers as a national bank was
preempted.169 This “obstruct, impair, or condition” is a broader
standard than Barnett’s “forbid, or to impair significantly” or
“prevent or significantly impair” standard, in that the
impairment no longer has to be significant.
Even state
regulation that did not forbid, prevent or significantly impair a
national bank’s exercise of its powers would be preempted if state
law merely “conditioned” the use of those powers, which is vague
and broad language. The OCC regulations further widened their
preemptive effect by mandating that only a specific set of state
laws could apply to national banks, and even then only those that
had a mere “incidental” effect on national banks’ powers, which
the regulation preamble defines as those that “form the legal
infrastructure that makes it practicable” for national banks to
exist and conduct business and “do not attempt to regulate the
manner or content of” the business of banking authorized for
national banks.170

164 Barnett Bank of Marion Cnty., N.A. v. Nelson, Fla. Ins. Comm’y, 517 U.S. 25, 33
(1996); 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(a) (2010) (original version at 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(a) (1997)).
165 Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed. Reg.
1904, 1904 (Jan. 13, 2004).
166 Preemption Determination and Order, 68 Fed. Reg. 46,264, 46,264 (Aug. 5, 2003).
167 Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed. Reg.
at 1904; 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.4007–09 (2010). For a discussion of this preemption order, see
Christopher L. Peterson, Federalism and Predatory Lending: Unmasking the Deregulatory
Agenda, 78 TEMP. L. REV.1, 70–71 (2005).
168 Barnett, 517 U.S. at 33.
169 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.4007, 7.4009.
170 Bank Activities and Operations, 69 Fed. Reg. 1912 (Jan. 13, 2004); 12 C.F.R.
§§ 7.4007(c), 7.4008(e), 7.4009(c), 34.4(b).
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The OCC regulations further limited state action by claiming
that the OCC has exclusive visitorial powers not only over
national banks, but also over their operating subsidiaries.171
Worse yet, even if a state law is not preempted and does apply to
a national bank, the states themselves cannot enforce that law
against the national banks, according to OCC’s regulations.172 At
most, a state can sue the national bank for declaratory relief,
seeking a judgment that the state law does apply to national
banks and is not preempted. However, only the OCC, according
to its regulations, could then enforce applicable state law, so that
the OCC could pick and choose which state law to apply, even
among those that are not preempted.173
The OCC expanded its powers of preemption in an advisory
letter by arguing that not only are national banks protected from
state regulation, even their local non-national bank agents are
protected from state licensing requirements when they are acting
in ways related to the national banks’ powers as such.174
The reaction against the OCC’s preemption expansion was
swift and initially futile. All fifty Attorneys General sent a letter
opposing the increased federal preemption of state law for
national banks, and they were joined by academics and consumer
advocates.175 Unfortunately, they were not immediately joined
by the courts, by and large. In the case Watters v. Wachovia
Bank, the Supreme Court appeared to condone the OCC’s
expansion of its powers of preemption, agreeing with the OCC
that the NBA’s preemption extended even to operating

171 Travis P. Nelson, Preemption Under Title X of the Dodd-Frank Act, BANKING LAW
COMMITTEE JOURNAL, Oct. 2010, at 5, available at http://apps.americanbar.org/
buslaw/committees/CL130000pub/newsletter/201010/nelson.pdf.
172 Bank Activities and Operations, 69 Fed. Reg. 1895, 1897; 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000 (“The
provisions of any State law to which a branch of a national bank is subject under this
paragraph shall been forced, with respect to such branch, by the Comptroller of the
Currency.”).
173 Bank Activities and Operations, 69 Fed. Reg. at 1899–900. For a discussion of
this point, see Wilmarth, supra note 128, at 228.
174 Letter from John E. Bowman, Chief Counsel, Office of Thrift Supervision,
Authority of a Federal Savings Association to Perform Banking Activities through Agents
Without Regard to State Licensing Requirements, P-2004-7 (Oct. 25, 2004), available at
http://www.ots.treas.gov/_files/560404.pdf. For a discussion of this, and the argument
that preemption protection for non-national banks leads to additional predatory behavior,
see Christopher L. Peterson, Preemption, Agency Cost Theory, and Predatory Lending by
Banking Agents: Are Federal Regulators Biting Off More Than They Can Chew?, 56 AM. U.
L. REV. 515, 543 (2007).
175 See discussion of the opposition in Peterson, supra note 174, at 70–71. For an
opposition letter from multiple consumer advocacy groups, see Letter to the Office of the
Comptroller
of
the
Currency,
(Oct.
6,
2003),
available
at
http://www.responsiblelending.org/media-center/press-releases/archives/CRLOCCsignon100603.pdf.
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subsidiaries of national banks as well as to the banks
themselves.176 The Supreme Court stated that national banks
have “the power to engage in real estate lending through an
operating subsidiary” and that this power of the national banks
“cannot be significantly impaired or impeded by state law.”177
The Watters case is interesting both for what it added to the
OCC’s preemptive powers and for what it withheld. On the one
hand, its extension of federal preemption to the operating
subsidiaries of national banks, even if those subsidiaries were
state-chartered, handed national banks and their subsidiaries an
enormous victory against state regulation.178 At the same time,
however, the Court failed to adopt the OCC regulations’ more
expansive preemption language, and instead cited Barnett as
finding preemption where “state prescriptions significantly
impair” the authority “enumerated or incidental under the
NBA.”179 Also, the Court did not rule on the issue of whether the
OCC had the power to declare the preemptive effects of its action
or seek judicial deference for its preemption declarations.180
While noting that the OCC had, by regulation, claimed to limit
the application of state law to national bank operating
subsidiaries only to the same extent such laws applied to
national banks, the Court did not decide what level of deference
to give those regulations, as its decision was based on the NBA
itself.181
The OCC’s and OTS’s efforts to lure financial institutions to
their charters through preemption appeared to be successful.
Engel and McCoy noted, “[a]lthough landing Countrywide was a
huge coup for OTS, the OCC was the biggest beneficiary of
charter shopping after 2003,” and also quoted the Comptroller as
crowing within months of adopting the preemption rule, “the past
several months have seen some notable movements of state
banks into the national system.”182 The market shares of their
regulated institutions grew as well. “Depository institutions and
their subsidiaries and affiliates accounted for about half of
nonprime loans originated in 2004 and 2005, 54% in 2006, and
79% in 2007.”183 Worse yet is the likelihood that the threat of
Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1, 18 (2007).
Id. at 21.
178 Id. at 18.
179 Id. at 12.
180 Id. at 20.
181 Id. at 20–21.
182 KATHLEEN C. ENGEL & PATRICIA A. MCCOY, THE SUBPRIME VIRUS: RECKLESS
CREDIT, REGULATORY FAILURE, AND NEXT STEPS 160–61 (2011).
183 Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial
176
177
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losing financial institutions to a federal charter encouraged
states to reduce the regulatory burden on their state-chartered
institutions.
During the Bush era, both the OCC and the OTS were
preempting state law regarding lending practices, not only to
lure banks and thrifts to their charters, but also in order to
reduce the total regulatory burden on banks and thrifts, based on
the belief that the markets should broadly be left to regulate
themselves.184 The OTS was especially brazen in its lack of
regulation for its member thrifts, and laid off sixty-nine thrift
examiners, while its director claimed his goal “was ‘to allow
thrifts to operate with a wide breadth of freedom from regulatory
intrusion’” and showed up with a chainsaw at a conference set up
to proclaim a reduction of red-tape and regulation.185
Countrywide switched from a bank to a thrift charter specifically
to take advantage of the fact that the OTS was more restrained
than the OCC in the application of its guidelines governing
alternative mortgage products.186
Federal regulators have since claimed that preempting state
regulation did not cause the influx of default-prone loans that
came after the OCC’s 2004 preemption regulation.187 However, a
review of default rates from 2006 to 2008 among depository
institutions shows that federally regulated banks and thrifts had
significantly higher default rates than those regulated by the
states, with federal thrifts by far the worst.188 As noted by Engel
and McCoy, “the best loan performance was at state bank and
thrifts, which were subject to both state and federal regulation
and did not enjoy preemption.”189
As a result of the federal preemption of state regulation of
national banks and thrifts, those banks and thrifts

Conglomerates and the Origins of the Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 CONN. L. REV. 963,
1018–19 (2009).
184 See McCoy, supra note 163, at 1349 (stating “[c]oncomitantly, OCC regulators and
their federal bank regulator counterparts were true believers in the ability of market
structures and new instruments to contain risk. When market innovations could contain
risk, the thinking went, why have government regulation?”).
185 ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 182, at 175.
186 Barbara A. Rehm, Countrywide to Drop Bank Charter in Favor of OTS, AM.
BANKER, Nov. 10, 2006, at 1.
187 See, e.g., John C. Dugan, Comptroller of the Currency, Remarks Before Women in
Hous. & Fin., Washington, DC (Sept. 24, 2009), available at http://www.occ.gov/newsissuances/speeches/2009/pub-speech-2009-112.pdf.
Dugan stated, “[i]t is widely
recognized that the worst subprime loans that have caused the most foreclosures were
originated by nonbank lenders and brokers regulated exclusively by the states.” Id.
188 ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 182, at 163.
189 Id.
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understandably became less willing to cooperate with state
regulators attempting to resolve consumer complaints. State
officials reported a noticeable effect from the preemptive strike
by federal regulators, diminishing state consumer protection
efforts.190 Although this perception was not universal, many felt
that national banks were less cooperative with state officials and
less concerned about consumer complaints.191
While state
officials stated that they had been able, before the assertion of
preemption, to informally resolve customer complaints
efficiently, once the OCC announced its intent to preempt state
regulation, some state agents felt that national banks became
significantly less cooperative.192
Worse yet, the OCC and OTS were not themselves engaging
in significant enforcement action for violations of consumer
protection by their regulated institutions. The OCC provided
little public evidence that it was sanctioning national banks for
consumer protection violations.
As Professor Arthur E.
Wilmarth, Jr. noted:
The OCC’s record is similarly undistinguished with respect to
consumer enforcement actions taken against national banks for
violations of consumer protection laws. Since January 1, 1995, the
OCC has taken only thirteen public enforcement actions against
national banks for violations of consumer lending laws. With two
exceptions, all of those actions were taken against small national
banks.193

IV. PREEMPTION AND SERVICER REGULATION
At the very beginning of the mortgage crisis, it was clear
that federal preemption of state law would reduce the states’
abilities to investigate or regulate the way national banks
serviced loans. In 2007, a group of state bank regulators,
concerned that borrowers were being foreclosed upon
unnecessarily, requested information from the biggest national
banks regarding their foreclosure operations. When two banks
refused to cooperate, the state bank examiners sent a letter to
the OCC, requesting its aid. Rather than helping, the OCC

190 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, OCC
FURTHER CLARIFY THE APPLICABILITY OF STATE
NATIONAL BANKS, GAO-06-387, at 17 (2006),
new.items/d06387.pdf.
191 Id.
192 Id. at 17–21.
193 Wilmarth, supra note 78, at 14 (noting how
national bank for a consumer protection violation,
banking regulators).

PREEMPTION RULES: OCC SHOULD
CONSUMER PROTECTION LAWS TO
available at http://www.gao.gov/

rarely the OCC has sanctioned any
especially when compared to state
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insisted that national banks should respond only to inquiries
from federal officials, claiming that it was going to collect the
information itself and did not want to risk “confusing matters.”194
Rather than “scrutinize the foreclosure operations” of the large
national banks, however, the OCC reportedly merely relied on
the banks’ own internal assessments of their procedures.195 As
foreclosures mounted and state attorneys tried to investigate the
causes of the dramatic increase in foreclosures, large servicers
regulated by the OCC reportedly refused even to turn over basic
servicing data, citing federal preemption.196
Federal preemption for national banks is especially
significant in the servicing industry because, as previously noted,
residential mortgage servicing is dominated by the servicing
arms of national banks and thrifts.197 The four largest servicers
are the servicing arms of Bank of America, Wells Fargo, Chase,
and CitiMortgage, which between them service over fifty-six
percent of the market.198 Because many of the largest mortgage
servicers are the parts of federally regulated financial
institutions, the expansion of OTS and OCC preemption and the
extension of preemption to the subsidiaries of national banks and
thrifts has provided servicers protection from state regulation.
Both the OTS and the OCC regulations specifically purport to
preempt all state regulation of mortgage servicing by national
banks and thrifts. The OTS regulations list, as examples of
the types of state laws preempted by paragraph (a) of this
section . . . state
laws
purporting
to
impose
requirements
regarding. . .
(5) Loan-related fees, including without limitation, initial charges,
late charges, prepayment penalties, servicing fees, and overlimit fees;
(6) Escrow accounts, impound accounts, and similar accounts;
....
(10) Processing, origination, servicing, sale or purchase of, or
investment or participation in, mortgages.199

194 A description of this episode can be found in Zachary A. Goldfarb, Regulators
Lagged in Foreclosure Oversight, WASH. POST, Nov. 8 2010, at A1.
195 Id.
196 Press Release, Office of Sen. Hillary R. Clinton, Sens. Clinton, Bayh Call on
Administration, Mortgage Services to Cooperate with State’s Efforts to Address Mortgage,
Foreclosure Crisis (Apr. 30, 2008), available at 2008 WLNR 8047227.
197 Wilmarth, supra note 78, at 2.
198 Firms Ranked by Number of Loans Serviced at 9/30, MORTGAGE SERVICING NEWS,
Feb. 2011, at 1.
199 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(b) (2010).
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The OCC regulations also expressly purport to preempt state
regulation of mortgage servicing, stating that “[s]pecifically, a
national bank may make real estate loans under 12 U.S.C. § 371
and § 34.3, without regard to state law limitations
concerning: . . . (10) Processing, origination, servicing, sale or
purchase of, or investment or participation in, mortgages.”200
The federal preemption of state law governing mortgage
servicing provided a challenge to courts: while the OTS and OCC
seemed to indicate a desire to occupy the field of regulating
mortgage servicing, clearly the states had to play some role in
providing the legal structure undergirding mortgage servicer
behavior. For example, the law governing mortgage foreclosure
is primarily a state creation, with some states mandating judicial
procedure and others allowing for non-judicial foreclosures.201
Given that a foreclosure is one of the most extreme steps taken
by servicers, federal regulators can hardly be said to occupy all
mortgage servicing regulation if they have not regulated how
federally regulated servicers foreclose.202
Mortgage servicers also needed other forms of state law to
apply to their mortgages and loans, including state negotiable
instrument law and contract law.203 Mortgage servicers clearly
should not be exempt from criminal law and general tort law,
providing liability for torts such as deception.204 Therefore,
contract, tort, and real property law were listed as examples of
the kinds of law NOT preempted by the OTS’s and OCC’s
regulation.205 The challenge for courts attempting to honor the
preemption regulations regarding mortgage servicing has been
trying to distinguish between permissible state regulation of

12 C.F.R. § 34.4(a).
Grant S. Nelson & Dale A. Whitman, Reforming Foreclosure: The Uniform
Nonjudicial Foreclosure Act, 53 DUKE L.J. 1399, 1403 (2004) (stating that “[m]ortgage
foreclosure law is in a state of pronounced disarray. A sizeable number of states mandate
judicial foreclosure, while others authorize a nonjudicial ‘power of sale’ foreclosure
proceeding. Additionally, many states impose a variety of postforeclosure restrictions,
including statutory redemption and limitations on deficiency judgments, whereas others
provide no such protections for debtors.”). See also Debra Pogrund Stark, Foreclosing on
the American Dream: An Evaluation of State and Federal Foreclosure Laws, 51 OKLA. L.
REV. 229, 230–31 (1998) (describing the interplay between state and federal laws
concerning foreclosure).
202 Stark, supra note 201, at 230–32.
203 Gibson v. World Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d 19, 28 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002)
(noting that HOLA does not preempt “duties to comply with contracts and the laws
governing them and to refrain from misrepresentation.”).
204 See Martinez v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., 598 F.3d 549, 555–57 (9th Cir.
2010) (stating that “various district courts have held that the [National Bank] Act does
not preempt a claim of express deception asserted under state law.”).
205 12 C.F.R. §§ 560.2(c), 34.4(b) (2010).
200
201
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foreclosures and tort law on the one hand, and what those
regulations list as impermissible state regulation of servicing on
the other.
In a 2007 case, Judge Posner attempted to define the
demarcation between the arguably preempted regulation of
servicing and non-preempted tort and contract law. He noted
that a borrower should be free to sue a servicer for breach of
contract or for fraud, given the OTS’s inability to adjudicate
disputes between borrower and servicer, finding that the
application of state tort or contract law “would complement
rather than substitute for the federal regulatory scheme.”206 The
task of a court, therefore, is to determine which state regulation
governs lenders and servicers as such, and so would be
preempted as to federally regulated institutions, and which
regulation is merely part of the general law of the state. The
essential question is “which claims fall on the regulatory side of
the ledger and which, for want of a better term, fall on the
common law side.”207
Courts have struggled, with inconsistent results, to
determine what state law constitutes “regulating servicing” and
is therefore deemed preempted by OCC and OTS regulation, and
what is merely the general law of the state. One court went so
far as to state that any state claim against a federally-chartered
thrift involving improprieties in foreclosures would be preempted
because such claims would necessarily involve servicing, etc. of
the loan, though claims that the servicer misled the borrower as
regarding a loan modification were not preempted.208 Another
court reached the opposite result on such deception, finding that
all state claims based on a servicer’s misrepresentations about
loan modifications were preempted because loan modifications
are an element of servicing.209 General consumer protection laws
seem to be part of the general law of the state, however, and

206 In re Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC Mortg. Servicing Litig., 491 F.3d 638, 643–44
(7th Cir. 2007).
207 Id. at 644. In that case, the court found that, due to the vagueness of the
complaint, “the case is largely unripe for a determination of preemption.” Id. at 648.
208 Ahmed v. Wells Fargo Bank & Co, No. 4:11cv00436, 2011 WL 1751415, at *3–4
(N.D. Cal. May 9, 2011). The court ruled that claims based on allegations that
“defendants falsely represented that plaintiff's loan would be modified and that the
foreclosure sale had been cancelled” were not preempted, however, because they “arise
from a more ‘general duty not to misrepresent material facts,’ and therefore [do] not
necessarily regulate lending activity.” Id. at *4 (quoting Becker v. Wells Fargo Bank,
N.A., No. 2:10cv02799, 2011 WL 1103439, at *8–9 (E.D. Cal. March 22, 2011)).
209 Wittenberg v. First Indep. Mortg. Co., No. 3:10cv00058, 2011 WL 1357483, at *14
(N.D. W. Va. April 11, 2011).

Do Not Delete

2011]

12/7/2011 2:22 PM

Foreclosing on the Federal Power Grab

211

some courts have for that reason held them not to be
preempted.210
Courts have likewise ruled inconsistently on whether state
restraint against unfair business practices should be preempted
as to federally regulated servicers. In a case where borrowers
alleged that servicers “routinely refused to discuss good faith
modifications” regarding their loans, the court determined that,
to the extent such actions constituted a violation of California’s
Unfair Competition Law, any claim based on that violation was
preempted by the OTS’s regulations.211 Similarly, where a loan
servicer was alleged to have engaged in unfair practices by using
inadequate property valuation methods to evaluate short sales
and unfair practices in making offers to postpone foreclosures,
the court found that simply because those activities “relate
entirely” to the defendant’s “processing, origination, servicing,
sale or purchase of, or investment or participation in, mortgages,”
the claims were preempted.212
By comparison, in a case where borrowers alleged unfair
business practices in overcharging for force-placed insurance, the
court found that California’s Unfair Competition Law was not
preempted, because it was a general business law, and even
though the subject matter concerned the servicing of loans, the
specific claims, that the defendants had made misrepresentations
and engaged in deceptive conduct, were not specific to lending.213
Courts have similarly considered whether unfair competition
laws are preempted by the National Bank Act as to servicers
regulated by the OCC.214 In one case, a borrower alleged that his

210 See, for example, Smith v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, No. 2:10-cv-00354,
2011 WL 843937, at *10 (S.D. W. Va. 2011), where the court states, “[i]nstead, I look to
the intent of Congress, as best demonstrated by the text of the NBA, and conclude that
there is no significant federal regulatory objective at play that would merit displacing the
generally applicable state consumer-protection claims presented in the Complaint.”
211 Biggins v. Wells Fargo & Co., 266 F.R.D. 399, 417 (N.D. Cal. 2009). See also In re
Ocwen, where the court found that a claim against a servicer pursuant to New Mexico’s
Unfair Trade Practices Act was preempted because it claimed “‘a gross disparity between
the value received by the [class] members [in New Mexico] and the price paid,’ a charge
that clearly is preempted.” In re Ocwen, 491 F.3d at 647.
212 Grant v. Aurora Loan Servs., Inc., 736 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1275 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
213 Gibson v. World Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d 19, 29–30 (Cal. Ct. App.
2002). See also, Binetti v. Wash. Mut. Bank, 446 F. Supp. 2d 217, 221 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)
(holding that because the effect on national thrifts was only an incidental part of the
state’s unfair competition law, that state law was not preempted even as to claims
regarding federally regulated thrifts).
214 Wells v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, No. C10-5001RJB, 2010 WL 4858252, at *10
(W.D. Wash. 2010), wherein the court found that claims under the Washington Consumer
Protection Act were not preempted even though they concerned misrepresentations
regarding foreclosures and borrowers’ requests for loan modifications.
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servicer had made misrepresentations about whether mortgage
prepayments would be applied to principal or held in suspense
accounts.215 The court found that because the borrower relied on
a general Unfair Competition Law (UCL) rather than a state law
“specifically directed at banking or lending,” the borrower’s claim
was not preempted even though it went directly to how the
servicer serviced the loan.216
In other cases, where borrowers claimed that a servicer
committed an unfair or deceptive act in violation of the state’s
Unfair and Deceptive Practices Act (UDAP) law, courts have held
that because the act consisted of mortgage servicing, the state
UDAP law was preempted even though it was a general business
law not specifically directed toward servicers.217 In a California
case, a court found that an unfair business practices claim was
preempted, stating “each of Plaintiffs’ claims specifically
challenge the processing of Plaintiffs’ loan modification
application and servicing of Plaintiffs’ mortgage, and fall within
the specific types of preempted state laws listed in § 560.2(b)(4) &
(10). Accordingly, each of Plaintiffs’ claims are preempted by
HOLA.”218 Courts have tried to explain these contradictory
results by arguing that when it comes to general statutes such as
UDAP, the question is not whether the statute will be generally
preempted, but rather whether as applied, the statute would
impose requirements on lending or servicing and so should be
preempted.219
In a recent case, the court applied a different standard to
judge whether state law was preempted, looking not at whether
the state law was a general one but rather at whether there was
an applicable federal claim that would preempt the state
claim.220 In that case, a borrower sued a servicer, alleging that
the servicer had told him not to make his mortgage payments so
that the borrower could become eligible for the HAMP program,

215 Jefferson v. Chase Home Fin., No. C 06-6510 TEH, 2008 WL 1883484, at *1 (N.D.
Cal. 2008).
216 Id. at *13–14.
217 James J. Pulliam, Good Cop, Bad Cop: Market Competitors, UDAP Consumer
Protection Laws, and the U.S. Mortgage Crisis, 43 LOY. L. REV. 1251, 1251 (2010).
218 Zarif v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, No. 10CV2688-WQH-WVG, 2011 WL 1085660,
at *3 (S.D. Cal. 2011).
219 Casey v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 583 F.3d 586, 593–94 (8th Cir. 2009); Boursiquot
v. Citibank F.S.B., 323 F. Supp. 2d 350 (D. Conn. 2004); Moskowitz v. Wash. Mut. Bank,
329 Ill. App. 3d 144, 263 Ill. Dec. 502, 768 N.E.2d 262 (2002); McCurry v. Chevy Chase
Bank, F.S.B., 144 Wash. App. 900, 193 P.3d 155 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008); Silvas v. E*Trade
Mortgage Corp., 514 F.3d 1001 (9th Cir. 2008).
220 Bennett v. Bank of America, No. 3:11cv00003, 2011 WL 1814963, at *2 (E.D. Va.).
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then foreclosed on his house based on non-payment of the loan.221
When the borrower brought state law claims for breach of
contract, fraud, and trespass, the bank/servicer responded by
claiming that those state law claims were preempted.222 The
court, however, held that the claims were not preempted because
there was no corresponding federal claim that the borrower could
bring, noting that “Congress has not provided an alternative
claim governing the allegations [the borrower] raises,” and
therefore neither federal law nor regulation preempted the state
claims.223
V. THE STATES JUMP IN
States have recently taken more aggressive steps to rein in
mortgage servicer abuse and to attempt to induce servicers to
make loan modifications that benefit both the borrower and the
investor.224 However, their efforts have at times been met with a
preemption defense. For example, in 2008, California passed
Senate Bill 1137, also known as the “Perata Mortgage Relief
Bill,” which requires, among other things, that in order to file a
notice of default to start a foreclosure, a servicer or lender must
follow a proscribed process of notification, meeting, and
consultation with the borrower, to determine whether the
servicer/lender and borrower can resolve the default without
foreclosure.225 The idea is to spur direct discussion between the
parties for an exploration of alternatives to foreclosure.”226 This
requirement is now incorporated in section 2923.5 of the
California Civil Code, part of the state’s statutory framework for
foreclosures.227
While section 2923.5 seems to be a minor requirement,
merely requiring notice and discussion, but not mandating any
loan modifications, federally regulated servicers have challenged
it by claiming that it is preempted, at least as to federally
regulated thrifts.228 Some courts have rejected this preemption
argument, finding that section 2923.5 requires so little of lenders

Id. at *1.
Id. at *1, *3.
Id. at *5.
Problems in Mortgage Servicing From Modification to Foreclosure Part II: Hearing
Before S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. (2010) (statement of
Kurt Eggert, Professor, Chap. Univ. Sch. of Law).
225 CAL. CIV. CODE § 2923.5 (2010).
226 CAL. CIV. CODE § 2923.5(f) (2010).
227 CAL. CIV. CODE § 2923.5 (2010).
228 Murillo v. Aurora Loan Servs., LLC, No. C 09-00503 JW, 2009 WL 2160579, at *4
(N.D. Cal. July 17, 2009).
221
222
223
224

Do Not Delete

214

12/7/2011 2:22 PM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 15:1

and servicers that it is not preempted by federal law.229 For
example, in Mabry v. Superior Court, the court found that section
2923.5, at least narrowly construed, did not step over the line
that separates the permitted state regulation of foreclosure from
the state regulation of loan servicing, which would be preempted
as to financial institutions regulated by the OTS.230 Mabry has
been cited with approval by several other courts.231
Another federal court ruled that because section 2923.5
“imposes a state law mandate about what information must be
given to borrowers, and includes a strict time frame for doing so”
and other states do not have such requirements, section 2923.5
“concerns the processing and servicing of Plaintiffs’ mortgage and
is preempted by HOLA.”232 Other federal courts have followed
suit,233 and have even gone so far as to assert that despite the
contrary opinions of California courts, “‘it is evident that the
overwhelming weight of authority has held that a claim under §
2923.5 is preempted by HOLA.’”234
Other states have taken more aggressive measures to
regulate servicers.
Numerous states currently have often
competing legislative proposals for servicer regulation. “To date,
lawmakers in 41 jurisdictions and the District of Columbia have

Mabry v. Superior Court, 110 Cal. Rptr. 3d 201, 218 (2010).
Id. at 218–19 (“Finally, to the degree that the ‘assessment’ or ‘exploration’
requirements impose, in practice, burdens on federal savings banks that might arguably
push the statute out of the permissible category of state foreclosure law and into the
federally preempted category of loan servicing or loan making, evidence of such a burden
is necessary before the argument can be persuasive. For the time being, and certainly on
this record, we cannot say that section 2923.5, narrowly construed, strays over the line.”).
231 Wienke v. Indymac Bank FSB, No. CV 10-4082 NJV, 2011 WL 871749, at *5 (N.D.
Cal. Mar. 14, 2011); Paik v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. C 10-04016 WHA, 2011 WL
109482, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2011); Aguilera v. Hilltop Lending Corp., No. C 10-0184
JL, 2010 WL 3340566, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2010); Kariguddaiah v. Wells Fargo Bank,
N.A., No. C 09-5716 MHP, 2010 WL 2650492, at *6 (N.D. Cal. July 1, 2010).
232 Odinma v. Aurora Loan Servs., No. C-09-4674 EDL, 2010 WL 1199886, at *8 (N.D.
Cal. Mar. 23, 2010).
233 See Giordano v. Wachovia Mortg., FSB, No. 5:1-cv-04661-JF, 2010 WL 5148428, at
*3–5 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2010); Taguinod v. World Sav. Bank, FSB, No. CV 10-7864-SVW
(RZx), 2010 WL 5185845, at *2–3 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2010); Ngoc Nguyen v. Wells Fargo
Bank, N.A., No. C-10-4081-EDL, 2010 WL 4348127, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2010);
Pinales v. Quality Loan Serv. Corp., No. 09cv1884 L(AJB), 2010 WL 3749427, at *3 (S.D.
Cal. Sept. 22, 2010); Gonzalez v. Alliance Bancorp, No. C 10-00805 RS, 2010 WL 1575963,
at *5 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2010); Parcray v. Shea Mortg., Inc., No. CV-F-09-1942
OWW/GSA, 2010 WL 1659369, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2010); Murillo v. Aurora Loan
Servs., LLC, No. C 09-00503 JW, 2009 WL 2160579, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 17, 2009);
Murillo v. Lehman Bros. Bank FSB, No. C 09-00500 JW, 2009 WL 2160578, at *5 (N.D.
Cal. July 17, 2009).
234 Beall v. Quality Loan Serv. Corp., No. 10-CV-1900-IEG (WVG), 2011 WL 1044148,
at *8 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2011) (quoting Taguinod v. World Sav. Bank, FSB, No. CV 107864-SVW (RZx), 2010 WL 5185845, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2010)).
229
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introduced legislation regarding foreclosures.”235 New York’s
Superintendent of Banks issued perhaps the most stringent state
mortgage servicing regulations in October 2010, requiring
servicers to pursue suitable loan modifications and imposing a
“duty of good faith and fair dealing in [the servicer’s]
communications, transactions, and course of dealings with each
borrower . . . .”236 The regulations limit what fees servicers can
charge and requires them to have “adequate staffing, written
procedures, resources and facilities to provide timely and
appropriate responses to borrower inquiries and complaints
regarding available loss mitigation options . . . .”237 Servicers
must provide timely responses to loan modification requests, and
where they deny them, must provide the reasons for such
denial.238 They must also provide a process by which borrowers
“may escalate disagreements to a supervisory level where a
separate review of the borrower’s eligibility or qualification for a
loss mitigation option can be performed” and provide “special
escalation contacts” for use by housing counselors, attorneys and
government agents.239 The regulations also allow the state to
require servicers to provide detailed reports of their modification
attempts and success.240
Nevada responded to the high rates of foreclosure by
requiring mortgage servicers to engage in mediation with
borrowers who request it.
The borrower and the
lender/beneficiary split the cost of paying the mediator and the
lender/beneficiary must be represented at the mediation by
someone with the authority to modify the loan at issue.241 The
parties are required to submit a proposal to “resolve the
foreclosure” and financial information that would allow the
evaluation of those proposals, and the lender/beneficiary has to
submit evidence of possession of the note and deed of trust along
with assignments of the note and deed of trust, as well as the
“evaluative methodology” used to evaluate the request for a loan
modification.242 Many different types of foreclosure mediation

235 NATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, FORECLOSURES 2011
LEGISLATION, http://www.ncsl.org/?tabid=22116.
236 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 3, § 419.2 (effective May 2, 2011).
237 Id. at §§ 419.10–419.11.
238 Id. at § 419.11(d).
239 Id. at § 419.11(g).
240 Id. at § 419.12.
241 NEV.
FORECLOSURE
MEDIATION
R.
10(1)(A),
available
at
http://www.nevadajudiciary.us/images/foreclosure/adkt435_amendedrules.pdf.
242 NEV. FORECLOSURE MEDIATION R. 11, available at http://www.nevadajudiciary.us/
images/foreclosure/adkt435_amendedrules.pdf.
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programs have sprung up, some at the state level, others
mandated by individual court systems.243
Utah changed its foreclosure laws to require foreclosures to
be conducted by an in-state attorney or title company. One large
bank responded by refusing to follow the law, based on the claim
that its status as a national bank gave it immunity from this
aspect of state foreclosure law, reportedly arguing, “[a]s a
national bank, [its] authority to act as trustee is derived from
federal law (the National Bank Act).”244
One potentially productive step that the states have taken is
the joint action by fifty Attorneys General to investigate
mortgage servicer abuse and demand change, beginning in
October 2010.245 That investigation was reportedly quite limited,
perhaps from fears that the federally regulated mortgage
servicers would claim preemption and refuse to cooperate.246
According to one news report after the coalition had already sent
part of a settlement offer, “no witnesses had been interviewed
and . . . the coalition had sent out just one request for
documents—and it has not yet been answered.”247 The coalition
of Attorneys General reportedly have been negotiating with the
large banks/servicers to settle claims of widespread improper
foreclosures, with at least some Attorneys General initially
pushing for a large fund to provide principal reductions for
borrowers as well as a set of rules that servicers must follow,
while banks are suggesting a much smaller settlement fund, no
mandated principal reductions and fewer rule changes. The
parties are also bargaining over how much the banks who are the
largest servicers should pay to settle with the Attorneys General.
At least some of the Attorneys General are reportedly asking for
$20 billion and the banks are reportedly offering $5 billion, with
the money either going in large part to principal reductions for
borrowers, under the Attorney General proposal or to repay
borrowers “previously wronged in the foreclosure process and

243 Shana H. Khader, Mediating Mediations: Protecting the Homeowner’s Right to
Self-Determination in Foreclosure Mediation Programs, 44 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS.
109, 111 (2010).
244 Tom Harvey, Bank Defies Utah Law on Foreclosures, THE SALT LAKE TRIBUNE,
May 12, 2011, at A6.
245 Ariana Eunjung Cha & Dina Elboghdady, States to Initiate Joint Foreclosure
Probe, WASH. POST, Oct. 13, 2010, at A13.
246 Gretchen Morgenson, Swift Deals May Not Be Sound Ones, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12,
2011, at BU1.
247 Id.
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provide transition assistance for borrowers who are ousted from
their homes” under the banks’ counteroffer.248
VI. THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND ITS EFFECT ON PREEMPTION
Given the recent record of abusive behavior by mortgage
servicers and also the harm caused by federal preemption of state
law governing mortgage lending, it is no surprise that when
Congress decided to reform the financial services industry, it
included not only some mortgage servicer reform, but also a rollback of the preemption effects of OCC and OTS regulation.249
The 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) includes Title X, which is separately
referred to as the Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010 (the
CFP Act).250 The Act contains some direct reforms of mortgage
servicing. It mandates the use of escrow accounts in certain
circumstances and requires disclosure for consumers who waive
such accounts.251 It imposes new duties on mortgage servicers
regarding qualified written requests and responses to borrowers,
force-placed insurance, and refunds of escrow funds.252 It
requires prompt crediting of loan payments as well as prompt
responses to loan payoff requests.253 And it requires greater
transparency in the calculations underlying servicer decisions in
the HAMP program.254
More importantly, at least in terms of this article, DoddFrank significantly limits federal preemption of state consumer
financial laws, even as to national banks and thrifts, and in
many ways signals an explicit return to the law as it stood in the
mid-1990s before the OTS and OCC made their preemption
power grabs.255

Nathan Koppel, Banks Willing to Pay $5 Billion to Settle Mortgage Mess, L. BLOG
WALL ST. J. (May 11, 2011, 10:04 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/05/11/bankswilling-to-pay-5-billion-to-settle-mortgage-mess/.
249 LAUREN SAUNDERS, NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, THE ROLE OF THE STATES
UNDER THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF
2010, at 2 (2010), available at http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/legislation/dodd-frank-roleof-the-states.pdf.
250 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). Title X of Dodd-Frank states, “This title may be cited as the
‘Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010.’” Id. at § 1001.
251 Id. at §§ 1461–62.
252 Id. at § 1463.
253 Id. at § 1464.
254 Id. at § 1482.
255 See Saunders, supra note 131, at 5–6. See also Michael Hamburger, The DoddFrank Act and Federal Preemption of State Consumer Protection Laws, 128 BANKING L.J.
9, 11–12 (2011).
248

OF THE

Do Not Delete

218

12/7/2011 2:22 PM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 15:1

Dodd-Frank and the CFP Act constitute a dramatic change
in the preemption landscape. Gone are the ideas that the federal
banking agencies are the sole regulators of banks and thrifts, and
that banks and thrifts can virtually ignore state regulation.
Congressional intent is the touchstone for preemption, and DoddFrank shows irrefutable Congressional intent to limit and roll
back federal preemption of state consumer finance law.256 The
CFP Act’s subtitle on preemption is called “Preservation of State
Law.”257 The subtitle reasserts the traditional role that states
have played in regulating the financial industry, including
national banks and thrifts.
Dodd-Frank, drafted in an era when federal preemption of
state law looms large as an issue, contains specific and extensive
language regarding its own preemptive effect and the preemptive
effect of other federal regulations. Dodd-Frank affects federal
preemption in four significant ways. First, the CFP Act states
explicitly what its own preemption effect is.258 Second, DoddFrank explicitly limits federal preemption of state law by the law
governing national banks and thrifts and regulations made
pursuant to that law.259
Third, Dodd-Frank transfers
responsibility for much federal financial consumer protection
(depending on the size of the financial institution) to the new
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), which is much
more constrained in how it can preempt state law.260 Lastly,
Dodd-Frank spells out non-preempted powers of states’ Attorneys
General to enforce state and federal law.261
The CFP Act explicitly limits the preemptive power of the
CFP Act itself, and therefore, presumably any regulations issued
pursuant to that Act.262 The CFP Act rules out field preemption
and limits its preemptive effect to conflict preemption, stating it
has preemptive effect only “to the extent that any such provision
of law is inconsistent with the provisions of this title, and then
only to the extent of the inconsistency.”263 Moreover, the CFP Act
also protects states’ power to provide greater consumer protection

Id. at §§ 1041–43.
Subtitle D of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Financial
Protection Act.
258 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, §§ 1044–45.
259 Id. at § 1043.
260 Id. at § 1041.
261 Id. at § 1042. For good descriptions of the changes to preemption made by the
Dodd-Frank Act, see Saunders, supra note 131, at 5–6; Hamburger, supra note 255, at
11–12.
262 Id. at § 1044.
263 Dodd-Frank § 1041(a)(1).
256
257
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than its own terms without state regulation necessarily being
considered in preemptive conflict with the CFP Act, so that its
federal consumer protection constitutes a floor rather than a
ceiling.264
In addition to abolishing the OTS, Dodd-Frank creates the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), which will have
the power “under Federal consumer financial law to administer,
enforce, and otherwise implement the provisions of Federal
consumer financial law,” and to “prescribe rules and issue orders
and guidance . . . to administer and carry out the purposes and
objectives of the Federal consumer financial laws, and to prevent
evasions thereof.”265 This rulemaking authority gives the CFPB
broad powers, since the “Federal consumer financial laws” it
oversees include not only the CFP Act, but also broad swaths of
the consumer law affecting borrowers, such as the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act, the Home Ownership and Equity
Protection Act of 1994, and the Real Estate Settlement
Procedures Act of 1974.266 Moreover, the consumer financial
protection functions of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors,
the OCC, and the OTS are all largely transferred to the CFPB,
with other regulators retaining examination and enforcement
powers for smaller financial institutions.267 This transfer of
much of the consumer protection function will make it more
difficult for the OCC to argue that consumer protection
provisions of state law are preempted by OCC regulation.
Next, Dodd-Frank reverses the field preemption claims of
OTS regulation and the effective field preemption of OCC
regulation,268 and instead provides that state consumer financial
laws are preempted by national banks, thrift laws, and
regulations only in three circumstances: (1) if the state consumer
financial law would have a “discriminatory effect on national
banks” compared to state chartered banks, (2) if “in accordance
with the legal standard for preemption in the decision of the
Supreme Court of the United States in Barnett Bank . . . the
State consumer financial law prevents or significantly interferes
with the exercise by the national bank of its powers,” and if (3)

264 Id. at § 1041(a)(2) (“For purposes of this subsection, a statute, regulation, order, or
interpretation in effect in any State is not inconsistent with the provisions of this title if
the protection that such statute, regulation, order, or interpretation affords to consumers
is greater than the protection provided under this title.”).
265 Id. at § 1022(a)–(b).
266 Id. at § 1002(12).
267 Id. at § 1061(b).
268 Id. at§ 1044(a).
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“the State consumer financial law is preempted by a provision of
Federal law other than this title.”269 State laws regulating
residential mortgage servicers should necessarily be “state
consumer financial laws” given the definition of that term in
Dodd-Frank.270
Both the text of Dodd-Frank itself and its legislative history
signal the return to the Barnett “prevent or significantly
interfere” standard. Not only does the text directly cite the
Barnett standard, but Dodd-Frank was specifically amended to
include that standard, as a colloquy on the record between
Senator Dodd and the senator who proposed the amendment
shortly before passage of Dodd-Frank makes clear.271 Moreover,
Congress rejected efforts to substitute the Barnett standard with
the more wide-ranging preemption standard that would have
preempted any state law that merely “hampered” or “impaired” a
bank’s powers under the National Bank Act.272
Dodd-Frank not only rolls back the preemption standard, it
also makes it much more onerous and difficult for the
Comptroller of the Currency to claim extensive powers of
preemption over state consumer financial law, setting up a series
of hurdles that the OCC must clear to preempt state law. DoddFrank mandates that preemption determinations “may be made
by a court, or by regulation or order of the Comptroller of the
Currency on a case-by-case basis, in accordance with applicable
law.”273 Thus, the statute explicitly provides courts with the
power to make preemption determinations and limits the

Id.
According to Dodd-Frank, “The term ‘State consumer financial law’ means a State
law that does not directly or indirectly discriminate against national banks and that
directly and specifically regulates the manner, content, or terms and conditions of any
financial transaction (as may be authorized for national banks to engage in), or any
account related thereto, with respect to a consumer.” Id. at § 5136C(a)(2).
271 See 156 CONG. REC. S5902 (July 15, 2010), in which after Senator Carper notes
with pleasure that his amendment regarding preemption standards was retained “with
only minor modifications” by the conference committee, and that his reading of the then
current language “indicates that the conference report still maintains the Barnett
standard for determining when a State law is preempted,” Senator Dodd replies that
Senator Carper is correct and “[t]hat is why the conference report specifically cites the
Barnett . . . case. There should be no doubt that the legislation codifies the preemption
standard stated by the U.S. Supreme Court in that case.” See discussion of this point in
Hamburger, supra note 255, at 11–12.
272 As noted by Lauren Saunders, “Congress did not adopt an amendment by Rep.
Bean that would have preempted a state law that ‘impairs, or hampers’ the business of
banking. Amendment 141 to H.R. 4173 at 6 (Offered by Rep. Bean Dec. 9, 2009).” LAUREN
SAUNDERS, NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, THE ROLE OF THE STATES UNDER THE
DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 2010 6 (2010),
available at: http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/legislation/dodd-frank-role-of-the-states.pdf.
273 Dodd-Frank § 1044(a).
269
270
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Comptroller of the Currency to making case-by-case
determinations, rather than engaging in blanket preemption
determinations as the OCC and OTS had previously done. Even
if the Comptroller determines that one state’s law is
substantially similar to another state’s law that the Comptroller
has already decided is preempted, the Comptroller must consult
with the newly established Bureau of Consumer Financial
Protection to seek its views regarding whether to extend such
preemption to the additional state’s law.274
The CFP Act forces the Comptroller of the Currency to make
the preemption determination personally, and can no longer
delegate such determinations to a subordinate, such as the OCC’s
chief counsel, who had written a series of interpretive letters
stating that various state laws were preempted.275 Furthermore,
no preemption finding of the Comptroller shall be valid “unless
substantial evidence, made on the record of the proceeding,
supports the specific finding.”276 Rather than merely issuing
preemption determinations based on its own judgment, the OCC
is required to hold some sort of proceeding, keep a record, and
admit
“substantial
evidence”
supporting
each
such
determination.277
Dodd-Frank also changes the standard of deference courts
apply to any OCC determination of preemption.278 Rather than
the deferential Chevron standard, asking if there is a rational
basis for the agency’s determination, instead, a court reviewing
an OCC finding of preemption is directed to assess “the validity
of such determinations, depending upon the thoroughness
evident in the consideration of the agency, the validity of the
reasoning of the agency, the consistency with other valid
determinations made by the agency, and other factors which the
court finds persuasive and relevant to its decision.”279 In essence,
this directs courts to use the less deferential Skidmore standard
in determining what weight to give agency determinations of the
preemption of its regulations.280 Dodd-Frank overrules the

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
278 DAVID H. CARPENTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41338 THE DODD-FRANK WALL
STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT: TITLE X, THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL
PROTECTION BUREAU 14–15 (2010).
279 Dodd-Frank, § 1044(a).
280 In Skidmore deference, the deference a court grants an agency’s decision “will
depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning,
its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it
274
275
276
277
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primary holding of the Watters case by mandating that state law
apply to subsidiaries of national banks to the same extent such
law would apply to other business entities subject to state law,
unless the subsidiaries are also national banks.281
Dodd-Frank also protects the powers of states, through their
Attorneys General, to enforce applicable state laws even against
national banks and thrifts, explicitly codifying the Supreme
Court’s decision in Cuomo v. Clearing House Assn.282 In other
words, the OCC’s visitorial powers to supervise national banks
and thrifts cannot be seen as preempting the power of states’
Attorneys General to sue those financial institutions and seek
discovery during such litigation. Furthermore, state Attorneys
General can sue national banks and thrifts to enforce regulations
made by the CFPB pursuant to the Act.283 The power of private
parties to enforce applicable state and federal law is also
explicitly protected.284
The CFP Act does provide a protection from the new
preemption rules for any contract entered into before its
enactment, with the idea that national banks and thrifts should
not immediately have all existing contracts overturned based on
the new preemption rules.285 However, it is difficult to see how
such a grandfather clause can be applied to mortgage servicers,
where these consumer contracts can last for thirty years. Such a
rule might leave states free to regulate servicers, but only as to
newer loans, which seems to be an unworkable system, and one
unintended in the drafting of Dodd-Frank. Much of the state
regulation of servicers would affect their operations as a whole,
rather than address specific loans. And it would make little
sense to have the borrowers who need servicer regulation the
most, those who were the victims of the subprime boom and
meltdown, be given fewer protections from servicer abuse than
newer borrowers.
Also, if the grandfathering of contracts

power to persuade, if lacking power to control.” Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134,
140 (1944). See discussion of this point in Saunders, supra note 131, at 7. For a
discussion of the difference between the Chevron and Skidmore standards, and questions
regarding the evolution of the Skidmore standard, see generally Jim Rossi, Respecting
Deference: Conceptualizing Skidmore Within the Architecture of Chevron, 42 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1105 (2001); Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern
Skidmore Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235 (2007).
281 Dodd-Frank § 1044(a).
282 Id. at § 1047(a) (stating that its announced rule is “[i]n accordance with the
decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Cuomo v. Clearing House Assn., L.
L. C. (129 S. Ct. 2710 (2009))”).
283 Id. at § 1042(a).
284 Id. at § 1047(a).
285 Id. at § 1043.
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included the servicing of contracts, servicers would be loath to
modify existing loans for fear of losing their grandfathered
preemption protection.
The OCC has responded to the preemption changes in DoddFrank by acknowledging that the preemption landscape has
changed, while at the same time attempting, it seems, to
minimize those changes.286 In an interpretive letter, the OCC’s
Acting Comptroller stated that the OCC planned to rescind its
regulations extending preemption to bank subsidiaries. The
Acting Comptroller disingenuously claims that the OCC’s
regulations purporting to preempt any state law that would
“obstruct, impair, or condition” national bank powers were
merely “the OCC’s effort to distill principles from Barnett and
cases cited in Barnett into an abbreviated regulatory standard,”
even though the regulations clearly were designed to expand
preemption far beyond the Barnett standard.287
However,
according to the letter, the OCC plans to remove the “obstruct,
impair, or condition” standard from its regulations in order to
conform to Barnett. However, the OCC appears ready to fight a
rear-guard action to preserve its expanded preemption claims,
arguing that Dodd-Frank’s requirement that the Comptroller
make preemption determinations on a case-by-case basis should
not be applied retroactively so as to “overturn existing precedent
and regulations,” an argument that seems designed to defend as
much as possible the OCC’s pre-Dodd-Frank regulation.288
The OCC has followed up with a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (NPR) that attempts to resist some of the
preemption changes mandated by Dodd-Frank.289 The OCC
admits in its commentary to the NPR that its regulation claiming
preemption for any state law that would “obstruct, impair, or
condition” is no longer valid and must be withdrawn.290 At the
same time, the OCC makes the odd claim that existing court
precedent based on the withdrawn language is still valid because
“[t]his language was drawn from an amalgam of prior
precedents . . . . To the extent any existing precedent cited those
terms in our regulations, that precedent remains valid, since the
286 Letter from John Walsh, Acting Comptroller of the Currency, to Sen. Thomas R.
Carper (May 12, 2011), available at http://www.aba.com/aba/documents/press/
OCC_preemption_ltrtoSenCarper051211.pdf.
287 Id.
288 Id.
289 See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 76 Fed. Reg. 30557 (proposed May 26, 2011)
(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. Pts. 4, 5, 7, 8, 28, & 34), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/
news-issuances/news-releases/2011/nr-occ-2011-62a.pdf.
290 Id. at 30563.
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regulations were premised on principles drawn from the Barnett
case.”291 In other words, the OCC is attempting to preserve its
discredited preemption rule by insisting that the precedent it
created is still valid. The OCC should have made a sweeping rewrite of its preemption regulations and revisit its previous
preemption claims, pursuant to the new marching orders under
Dodd-Frank.
However, its NPR does not contain such a
widespread re-write, and instead appears to constitute a claim
that Dodd-Frank did little to alter the preemption landscape for
federal bank and thrift regulation. The OCC will not give ground
easily on preemption, it appears, even in the face of Dodd-Frank.
CONCLUSION
It is clear that Dodd-Frank is designed to be a dramatic curb
on the power of federal agencies, and specifically the OCC, to
preempt state law even when it comes to national banks. By
rolling preemption back to the Barnett standard, Dodd-Frank
undoes the OCC’s and the OTS’s efforts to obtain Chevron
deference for their insistence that their regulations occupy the
field or virtually occupy the field regarding their regulated
financial institutions.
The question remains, however, what the states can do with
this regained power. While preemption has been rolled back, it
has not been eliminated. Tellingly, the OCC retains visitorial
power, by far the greatest regulatory power, because visitorial
power allows the OCC to demand to see the banks’ books without
having to file a lawsuit to do so.292 At the same time, much that
had been preempted should now be fair game again. To the
extent that states are enforcing the kind of existing best practices
and servicing standards that are already contemplated in the
FTC’s settlements with rogue servicers or in HAMP, it is hard to
see how banks or the OCC can claim that such state regulation
would “prevent or significantly interfere” with a national banks’
exercise of its powers, under the Barnett standard for
preemption.293 Similarly, given the longstanding state regulation
of debt collection and foreclosure, the two most important duties
of a mortgage servicer, it is difficult to see how, absent aggressive
OCC and OTS preemption regulations, a court would conclude
that servicer regulation was preempted. Now that the financial
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consumer protection aspects of OCC and OTS regulation have by
and large been transferred away from them, their powers to
preempt state consumer protection in the area of mortgage
servicing should be minimal. State officials should find national
banks and thrifts much more willing to cooperate with them,
even if informally, for fear that a state Attorney General might
bring suit.
Given the lack of federal standards, and the go-ahead from
Dodd-Frank, the best strategy by states could well be to plow
forward with effective servicer regulation. While we are in the
midst of a mortgage foreclosure crisis, this is no time for
continued dithering and half measures. States should assert
their right to control their own foreclosure processes, and to
demand whatever steps they deem appropriate in those
processes, including mediation.
States should enact best
practices standards for mortgage servicers in the state, and
argue that such best practices standards should not be
preempted because they should not, under the Barnett standard,
“prevent or significantly interfere with the national bank’s
exercise of its powers.”294
It will take federal regulators some time to prepare the
regulations called for under Dodd-Frank. It will take courts
longer to determine the contours of the new banking law
preemption rules. However, given that the mortgage crisis is
ongoing, states, especially those that are bearing the brunt of
that crisis, should act now.
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